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U t i l i t a r i a n  Logic i n  the  Resource Mobi l iza t ion perspect iveL 
Int roduct ion 
Beware of economists bearing g i f t s .  Their  models a r e  catching the  
fancy of a  number of s o c i o l o g i s t s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s o c i a l  movements (e.g. 
Oberschall ,  1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; T i l l y ,  1978). We welcome 
t h e  focus on resources ,  organizat ion,  and s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n ;  and i t ' s  
r e f r e s h i n g  t o  g e t  away from the  concern with i r r a t i o n a l i t y  t h a t  bl inded 
s o c i o l o g i s t s  t o  'problems of resource mobi l iza t ion.  But t h e  economists' 
models c a r r y  t h e i r  own set of b l i n d e r s .  
I n  the study of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion ,  u t i l i t a r i a n  assumptions and the  
conceptual imagery of economics a r e  most u s e f u l  when re levan t  i n t e r e s t s  
. . . a r e  given, concre te  and s e l f i s h .  . Perhaps resource mobi l iza t ion by business. . . . .  
f i rms proceeds under roughly these  condi t ions ,  b u t  the  mobi l iza t ion of 
s o c i a l  movements o f t e n  hinges on changing i n t e r e s t s ,  changing oppor tun i t i e s  
and t h r e a t s  t o  i n t q r e s t s , .  and changing i n c l i n a t i o n s  t o  a c t  on group i n t e r -  . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . .  _ : .  . - . '  . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .    . . .  . . . . .  . . 
ests r a t h e r  than ind iv idua l  ones. Such matters tend t o  be  obscured by 
u t i l i t a r i a n  models, i f  not ignored a l t o g e t h e r .  
W e  t r y  t o  unravel severa l  problems wi th  u t i l i t a r i a n  approaches t o  
s o c i a l  movements, by considering Mancur Olson's  i n f l u e n t i a l  Logic of 
Col lec t ive  Action. I n  f a i r n e s s  t o  Olson, we should no te  t h a t  he meant 
t o  account f o r  the  mobi l iza t ion of longstanding unions, lobbies ,  and 
i n t e r e s t  groups; he  d i d n ' t  mean t o  account f o r  t h e  mobi l iza t ion of col-  
l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t h a t  i s  more d r a s t i c  o r  shor t - l ived.  However, the t h r u s t  
of the  f i e l d  i n  recen t  years i s  t o  abandon sharp d i s t i n c t i o n s  between 
dramatic s o c i a l  movements and o the r  p o l i t i c a l  organizat ions .  Now, i t  may 
be worth considering the circumstances in which Olson's utilitarian logic 
does not fit social movements, or for that matter, collective action in 
general. 
Olson was helpful in demonstrating that rational people with common 
interests don't automatically pursue them'collectively. It's often dif- 
ficult for.people to get together and pool resources. Mobilization re- 
quires enterprise and effort. But when .we investigate the strategy and 
tactics of organizers, we find Olson's logic misleading. We find that 
only in special circumstances is it both possible and worthwhile to use 
11 selective incentives" to get people to struggle for common interests. 
More often, when events and organizers mobilize people, it is because they 
build solidarity, raise consciousness of common interests, and create 
opportunities for collective action. 
So, we begin this essay with a critical look at how utilitarian 
. . . . ' .  . . . . . -. . 
logic has been applied to the mobilization of collective action. We go on 
to suggest that an alternative approach offers more promising ground for 
advancing research within the resource mobilization perspective. 
Resource Mobilization and Utilitarian Logic 
Research from the resource mobilization perspective finds people's 
shared grievances, interests, and aspirations considerably less problematic 
than their capacity to act on them collectively. From this perspective, 
the key question asked of a social movement is no longer: 
"Why do these people want social change so badly and believe that 
it's possible?" but rather: 
"How can these people organize, pool resources, and wield them 
effectively? 
It might seem t h a t  f o r  a  good p a r t  of our answer t o  the  l a t t e r  ques- 
t i o n ,  we  would soon r e t u r n  t o  the. former one. Af te r  a l l ,  i s n ' t  i t  e a s i e r  
t o  b r i n g  people i n t o  a  s o c i a l  movement when they f i n d  the  movement's 
goals  and s t r a t e g i e s  worthwhile? Sure ly ,  the  l e s s  concerned t h a t  poten- 
t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s  a r e  about t h e  s o c i a l  change the  movement is demanding, 
the  more d i f f i c u l t  i t  is f o r  the  movement t o  organize them. So, shouldn' t  
s t u d e n t s  and o rgan ize r s  of mobi l i za t ion  focus t h e i r  concern on the  sub- 
s t ance  and i n t e n s i t y  of shared gr ievances ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  and a s p i r a t i o n s ?  
Perhaps not  -- a t  l e a s t  n o t  i f  w e  accept  the  impl ica t ions  of Olson's  
Logic of Co l l ec t ive  Action '(1965). Oberschall  (1973) and McCarthy and 
Zald (1977) apply Olson's l o g i c  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  s o c i a l  movements. They 
suggest  t h a t  a  theory of mobi l i za t ion  should focus on the  c o s t s  and 
b e n e f i t s  s e l e c t i v e l y  meted o u t  t o  p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s  contingent  
upon whether o r  n o t  they c o n t r i b u t e  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  Shared gr iev-  
. . ' . 
ances and i n t e r e s t s  may warrant  less a t t e n t i o n  f o r  one of s e v e r a l  pos- 
s i b l e  reasons.  
F i r s t ,  people look out  f o r  t h e i r  personal  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  They. 
. . , . a c t  c o l l e c t i v e l y  only  i f  they a r e  provided w i t h .  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives .  . . 
O r ,  second: everywhere the re  i s  an abundance of i n t e r e s t s  t o  be 
r e a l i z e d  and i n j u s t i c e s  t o  be p r o t e s t e d .  They may he lp  us de l imi t  
the  groups " a t  r i s k "  t o  mobi l iza t ion ,  b u t  they do n o t  he lp  us s e l e c t  
which p o t e n t i a l  groups we expect  t o  mobi l ize  a  l o t ,  a  l i t t l e ,  o r  no t  
a t  a l l .  O r ;  t h i r d :  perhaps changes i n  the  substance and i n t e n s i t y  
of shared i n t e r e s t s  a f f e c t  the  p ropens i ty  of p o t e n t i a l  groups t o  mob- 
i l i z e ,  b u t  no t  i n  d e c i s i v e  ways. "Objective" i n t e r e s t s  change only 
with long-run h i s t o r i c a l  processes;  t h e i r  impact upon the  r ap id  dynamics 
of mobi l iza t ion  i s  mediated by processes  t h a t  a r e  more proximate and 
va r i ab le .  "Subjective" i n t e r e s t s  may vary i n  the  s h o r t  run, bu t  they 
a r e  l e s s  problematic than the  var ious  f o r c e s  which shape them. I n  o ther  
words, c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  e i t h e r  not  proximate enough, a r  not prob- 
lematic-enough, t o  occupy cen te r  s t a g e  i n  the  s tudy of s o c i a l  movements. 
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We f i n d  these  arguments dubious. We don ' t  deny t h a t  mobi l iza t ion 
is heavi ly  inf luenced by a number of f a c t o r s  s l i g h t e d  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  
s o c i a l  movement research:  the  amount of resources  a t  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  of 
p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  the  degree of previously e x i s t i n g  organizat ion 
among p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  the  conf igura t ion  of a l l i e s  and enemies, 
the  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  p o l i c i e s  of a u t h o r i t i e s ,  t h e  s t r a t e g y  and t a c t i c s  of 
organizers ,  and -- o v e r a l l  -- t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of the  p o l i t i c a l  economy 
const ra in ing the  mobi l iza t ion and wielding of resources.  
But t h e  impact of these  f a c t o r s  upon mobi l iza t ion f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  is  o f t e n  mediated more by changes i n  group i n t e r e s t s  than by changes i n  
t h e  provis ion of " s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives , "  more by assessments of c o l l e c t i v e  
e f f i c a c y  than by assessments of i n d i v i d u a l  e f f i c a c y ,  more by s o l i d a r i t y  
and p r i n c i p l e  than - by i n d i v i d u a l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  . 
Before going i n t o  t h e  argument, w e  should i n d i c a t e  what we mean by 
some key terms: " c o l l e c t i v e  good," " s e l e c t i v e  incent ive ,"  "actor ,"  and . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  ..... . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  . . : , . . 
- .  
. . . . . . . .  , 
" c o l l e c t i v e  act ion."  ' Any good o r  s e r v i c e  o r  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  i s  a col lec-  
t i v e  good i n s o f a r  a s  everyone i n  some group can b e n e f i t  from i t  (or  enjoy -
i t ) ,  r egard less  of whether o r  no t  they he lp  t o  pay t h e  c o s t  of providing 
it.  For example, a  change i n  government pol icy ,  o r  a  change i n  working 
condi t ions ,  is a c o l l e c t i v e  gobd f o r  everyone who wants i t  t o  happen. I n  
t h i s  paper the  r e d r e s s  of shared grievances,  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  of shared 
i n t e r e s t s ,  the  achievement of whatever i s  j u s t i f i e d  by shared b e l i e f s .  -- 
these  mat te r s  a r e  considered c o l l e c t i v e  goods f o r  a l l  who share  the griev- 
ances, i n t e r e s t s ,  o r  b e l i e f s .  
s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  a r e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o r  inducements which an indi -  
v i d u a l  a c t o r  may gain  o r  l o s e  cont ingent  upon whether o r  not  t h e  a c t o r  
con t r ibu tes  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  Actors a r e  persons as wel l  a s  organ- 
i z a t i o n s  .with t i g h t  decision-making and s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  mechanisms. We 
assume here  ( f o r  t h e  sake of argument), t h a t  a c t o r s  may-be i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  t h e  occurrence of var ious  s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  much a s  they may be i n t e r -  
e s t e d  i n  the  possession of var ious  commodities. We assume f u r t h e r  t h a t  
t h e  degree t o  which they a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  each of t h e  v a r i e t y  of 
r e l e v a n t  c o l l e c t i v e  goods and s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives ,  can be measured i n  
comparable u n i t s .  Co l lec t ive  a c t i o n  i s  s t r u g g l e  t o  b r i n g  about col- 
l e c t i v e  goods, s t r u g g l e  which involves organiz ing a c t o r s  and mobil izing 
resources .  Co l lec t ive  a c t o r s  a r e  o rgan ize r s  and formal organizat ions  
whose p r w r y  purpose i s  t o  ca r ry  on such a  s t rugg le .  
Consider the  f i r s t  and s t ronges t  of the  th ree  arguments c i t e d  
\ 
above on why grievances and i n t e r e s t s  may be removed from center  
s t a g e  i n  the  study of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion.  Olson argues t h a t  people 
act c o l l e c t i v e l y  only when the re  a r e  " s e l e c t i v e  incent ives"  f o r  them' . ' . .. 
t o  do s o  (1965). He takes  a  u t i l i t a r i a n  model of behavior i n  a  
market economy, and a p p l i e s  i t  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion  i n  general :  
The r a t i o n a l  ind iv idua l  i n  the  economic system does not  
c u r t a i l  h i s  spending t o  prevent  i n f l a t i o n  . . . because he 
knows, f i r s t ,  t h a t  h i s  own e f f o r t s  would not have a  no t i ceab le  
e f f e c t ,  and second, t h a t  he would g e t  the  b e n e f i t s  of any 
p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  o t h e r s  achieved i n  any case.  For t h e  
same two reasons,  the  r a t i o n a l  ind iv idua l  i n  a  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  
context  w i l l  no t  be w i l l i n g  t o  make any s a c r i f i c e s  t o  achieve 
the  o b j e c t i v e s  he sha res  with o t h e r s  (p. 166). 
Only a  separa te  and "se lec t ive"  incen t ive  w i l l  s t imula te  
a  r a t i o n a l  ind iv idua l  i n  a  ( l a r g e )  group t o  a c t  i n  a  group- 
o r i en ted  way . . . group a c t i o n  can be  obtained only through 
a n  incen t ive  t h a t  opera tes ,  no t  ind i sc r imina te ly , ' r ' i ke  the  
.I)  
c o l l e c t i v e  good, upon the  group a s  a  whole, b u t  r a t h e r  se lec-  
t i v e l y  toward the  ind iv idua l s  i n  t h e  group (p.  151).  
Olson concludes t h a t  common i n t e r e s t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods i s  not  
s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a  l a r g e  group of a c t o r s  t o  g e t  together  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n ,  while the  provis ion of s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  is necessary f o r  i t .  
So mild a . conc lus ion  may be s u r p r i s i n g .  Much s t ronger  conclusions a r e  
t h e r e  t o  be der ived from the  u t i l i t a r i a n  assumption t h a t  he  r e l i e s  on. 
. . .  
I f  ind iv idua l s  a r e  thoroughly s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  and r a t i o n a l ,  common i n t e r -  
ests a r e  unnecessary t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  w e l l  a s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  -- i n  
f a c t  they a r e  i r r e l e v a n t .  Furthermore, t h e  provis ion of s e l e c t i v e  incen- 
t i v e s  i s  n o t  only. necessary.: t o  produce c o l l e c t i v e .  ac t ion .  bu t  is  s u f f i c i e n t  .: . . . .  ' . . . . .  
What impl ica t ions  could s o c i a l  movement organizers  draw from the  
u t i l i t a r i a n  l o g i c  of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion?  Evidently i t ' s  a  waste of time 
f o r  organizers  t o  demonstrate t o  p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s  t h a t  t h e i r  goals  
a r e  worthwhile and t h e i r  s t r a t e g y  i s  v i a b l e .  Consciousness-raising cannot 
move a c t o r s  whose p u r s u i t  of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  i s  unflagging. It seems t h a t  
movement propaganda should a d v e r t i s e  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  r a t h e r  than 
j u s t i f y  program and s t r a t e g y .  
Furthermore, when organizers  t a r g e t  p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s  f o r  
organizing dr ives ,  they needn' t  be concerned with who may be most i n t e r -  
e s t e d  i n  the  c o l l e c t i v e  goods t h e y ' r e  t r y i n g  to  b r i n g  about .  They need 
only be concerned wi th  who may be  most i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the  s e l e c t i v e  incen- 
t i v e s  they can o f f e r .  Soc ia l  movement o rgan iza t ions  should o f t e n  f i n d  
themselves competing with o the r  o rgan iza t ions  f o r  the  resources  of t h e i r  
p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  There is  no reason t o  expect  t h i s  competi t ion t o  
come only from o t h e r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s .  Soc ia l  movement o rgan iza t ions  a r e  
a c t u a l l y  a t  a  compet i t ive  disadvantage i n  providing s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  
compared t o  bus inesses ,  s o c i a l  c lubs ,  and mafiosa, f o r  example. None of 
these  o rgan iza t ions  i s  saddled with the  burden of d i v e r t i n g  resources  f o r  
t h e  provis ion  of c o l l e c t i v e  goods; they can o f f e r  a  b e t t e r  d e a l  i n  the  
s e l e c t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  market. 
I n  f a c t  much of the  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  c i t e d  by Olson a s  evidence f o r  
h i s  argument was mobilized by o rgan ize r s  who were a t  a  competi t ive disad- 
vantage i n  the  s e l e c t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  market a s  compared t o  t h e i r  own 
. , . : 
an tagon i s t s  . Consider the  s t r u g g l e s  t h a t  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  f i r s t  b i g  unions. 
Employers could h i r e ,  promote, o r  f i r e  workers according t o  t h e i r  s tance  
toward the  union. I f  union o rgan ize r s  could t r y  t o  coerce wavering workers 
. - t o  honor p i c k e t  l i n e s ,  employers could. h i r e  scabs. and thugs'.t.o d i s r u p t  .. . . . 
them. Employers could o f t e n  c a l l  on the  government f o r  he lp .  And when 
employers chose t o  wield the  "carro t"  i n  add i t ion  t o  t h e  " s t i c k , "  they 
had the  resources  t o  provide more " s o c i a l  incent ives"  (e.g. s t a t u s  symbols 
and s o c i a b l e  occasions)  and f r i n g e  b e n e f i t s  than those  a  s t r u g g l i n g  union 
could o f f e r .  
Olson does n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  p o r t r a y  t h e  a c t o r s  who j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  a s  though they scramble f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  b e n e f i t s -  i n  a  wide open 
market where c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  would be  well-advised t o  a d v e r t i s e  s e l e c t i v e  
i n c e n t i v e s  r a t h e r  than programs. But t h e  assumptions underlying h i s  
conclusions do imply so crude a  p i c t u r e .  I f  i t  is hard t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  do t h e i r  mobil izing i n  a s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  market, 
and i f  i t  is  hard t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  an  a c t o r ' s  i n t e r e s t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods 
i s  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  h i s  propensity t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion ,  then we 
must ques t ion Olson's  conclusion t h a t  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  a r e  necessary 
f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
Perhaps t h e  appeal  of the  Logic of Col lec t ive  Action t o  those who 
s tudy s o c i a l  movements l ies  no t  i n  t h e  p l a u s i b i l i t y  of i t s  assumptions 
o r  conclusions,  b u t  r a t h e r  i n  the  ques t ions  i t  suggests  f o r  our research 
agenda : 
1 )  Of t h e  many groups t h a t  could poss ib ly  mobil ize t o  s t rugg le  
f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  goods, how is  i t  t h a t  some a r e  a b l e  t o  mobil ize 
a g r e a t  dea l ,  o t h e r s  much l e s s ,  and many none a t  a l l ? ,  
2)  How do a c t o r s  a s s e s s  what may b e  gained and l o s t  through 
._:. , . .  , .  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and how.do such assessments . shape . t h e i r  .: ' 
dec i s ions  t o  j o i n  i n  i t ?  
3) How can mobi l iza t ion be f a c i l i t a t e d  by "resourceful  ac to r s"  
.. . . . . . - a f t e n  previous.ly : es tablished;,organizations and -experienced . .. , . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . .. . . . . . :... . 
organizers  who c o n t r o l  c r u c i a l  resources?  
These a r e  good ques t ions .  But Olson's d e l i m i t a t i o n  of groups a t  r i s k  t o  
, mobi l iza t ion,  h i s  handling of the f r e e  r i d e r  problem, and h i s  treatment 
of r e source fu l  a c t o r s  p resen t  s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  We d i scuss  these 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s  a  prelude t o  . l a t e r  d iscuss ion of an a l t e r n a t i v e  ap- 
proach. 
Who is a t  Risk t o  Mobil izat ion 
Take a s  a problem the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of a  populat ion a t  time t-1 i n  
order  t o  p r e d i c t  f o r  time t what groups w i l l  be engaged i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  I f  the  time i n t e r v a l  i s  long enough (say a year o r  f i v e   ears), 
i t  may be t h a t  a  number of organizat ions  engaged i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a t  
time t d i d  not  even e x i s t  a t  time t-1, and i t  may be  t h a t  some i n t e r e s t s  
pursued f e r v e n t l y  a t  t weren' t  a r t i c u l a t e d  o r  even sensed a t  t-1. Unt i l  
w e  s p e c i f y  the  purpose and the theory underlying t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  i t  is  
not  c l e a r  what combinations of people, o rgan iza t ions ,  r o l e s ,  s t a t u s e s ,  
o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s ,  and/or s u b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  e x t a n t  i n  t h e  population 
a t  time t-1 we should i n v e s t i g a t e  t o  see i f  they give  rise t o  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  a t  t .  
I n  Logic of Col lec t ive  Action the  e n t i t i e s  a t  r i s k  t o  mobi l iza t ion 
a r e  "groups" -- defined a s  aggregates of i n d i v i d u a l s  shar ing common 
i n t e r e s t s .  More p r e c i s e l y ,  Olson cons ide rs  an aggregate of a c t o r s  t o  be 
a t  r i s k  t o  mobi l iza t ion when some c o l l e c t i v e  good i s  worth more t o  each 
"group" member than h i s  sha re  of what i t  would c o s t  t o  b r ing  about the  
good were a l l  "group" members t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t h e i r  share .  H e  a l s o  suggests  
. . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  
t h a t  a l ready  mobilized organizat ions  tend t o  demobilize -- per i sh ,  even -- 
i f  they f a i l  t o  se rve  t h e  common i n t e r e s t s  of t h e i r  members. So according 
t o  Olson, a  group has the  p o t e n t i a l  t o  mobi l ize  o r  t o  survive  a s  a v iab le  
. . c o l l e c t i v e  .actor .  . . when' t h e  . t o t a i  worth ( t o  group members) of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  . , . ' .  . . 
goods exceeds the  t o t a l  c o s t  ( t o  group members) of the  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
i t  takes  t o  b r i n g  them about. 
But then Olson goes on t o  argue t h a t  t h e  group won't r e a l i z e  t h i s  
p o t e n t i a l  un less  i t s  members a r e  provided wi th  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives .  He 
s t a t e s  t h a t  i n  order  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  mobi l iza t ion,  t h e  value  of t h e  s e l e c t i v e  
incen t ives  ( i n  terms of each i n d i v i d u a l ' s  preferences)  must b e  g rea te r  
than the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  sha re  of the  c o s t  of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  This i s  
a bold a s s e r t i o n .  Evidently Olson b e l i e v e s  t h a t  u n t i l  the  worth of t h e  
c o l l e c t i v e  good exceeds the  cos t  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  mobil izat ion is 
o u t  of the  quest ion;  b u t  once t h a t  th resho ld  i s  exceeded, f u r t h e r  inc rease  
i n  the  worth of the  c o l l e c t i v e  good i s  i r r e l e v a n t .  From then on, mobili- 
za t ion  hinges only on the  worth of the  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives .  
Olson's  u t i l i t a r i a n  assumptions a r e  s o  heavy they v i t i a t e  h i s  i n i t i a l  
method of s e l e c t i n g  groups t o  i n v e s t i g a t e .  Af ter  a l l ,  i f  t h e  value of 
t h e  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  must exceed the  c o s t  of jo in ing i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n ,  then why be concerned wi th  common i n t e r e s t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods 
when s e l e c t i n g  groups t o  i n v e s t i g a t e ?  Even a c t o r s  who a r e  thoroughly 
i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  the  c o l l e c t i v e  good would be a p t  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  co l l ec -  
t i v e  a c t i o n  i f  o f fe red  s e l e c t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  worth more than the  c o s t  of 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  (We don ' t  doubt t h a t  s o c i a l  movement organizers  provide 
such valuable  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  when they have the  capaci ty  t o  ga in  
by doing so; we do doubt t h a t  they g e n e r a i l y  have t h i s  capaci ty ,  and w e  
doubt t h a t  they genera l ly  need i t  t o  succeed.) It i s  poss ib le  t h a t  many 
s o c i a l  processes may be  b e s t  understood wi th  a theory p o s i t i n g  t h a t  one 
v a r i a b l e  only limits the  outcomes whi le  another v a r i a b l e  only s e l e c t s  
wi th in  t h e  limits. But we  can th ink of no good reason why a c t o r s '  common 
i n t e r e s t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods should preclude t h e i r  mobi l iza t ion when i t ' s  
below a threshold  l e v e l ,  y e t  be i r r e l e v a n t  above t h a t  l e v e l .  
. . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . ' ..: . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . 
It would no t . 'he ip  ' k t te rs  to. abandon common i n t e r e s t s  a l tog=  t h e r  
and move t o  a thoroughly u t i l i t a r i a n  a n a l y s i s  of what l i m i t s  who i s  a t  
r i s k  t o  mobi l iza t ion.  It might make sense  t o  do so  were we studying t h e  
"mobilization" of l abor  by business  f i rms.  The uneniployed, f o r  example, 
a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  a t  r i s k  t o  mobi l iza t ion by a business o f f e r i n g  pay f o r  
work, r egard less  of how much they are i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the  goods t h a t  bus iness  
i s  t r y i n g  t o  produce. But does i t  make sense  t o  assume t h a t  people i n  
need of the  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  t h a t  a  s o c i a l  movement can o f f e r  a r e  
e s p e c i a l l y  a t  r i s k  t o  mobi l iza t ion,  r egard less  of what s o c i a l  change the  
movement is  t ry ing  t o  produce? Whether o r  not  one 's  t a s t e  f o r  chocola te  
a f f e c t s  one ' s  propensi ty  t o  take  a  job i n  a  chocola te  f a c t o r y ,  s u r e l y  
one ' s  t a s t e  f o r  c i v i l  r i g h t s  a f f e c t s  one ' s  propensi ty  t o  j o i n  i n  a . 
c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement. 
La te r  w e  argue t h a t  a  number of f a c t o r s ,  inc luding i n t e r e s t  
i n  i n d i v i d u a l  goods, i n t e r e s t  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods, and s o l i d a r i t y  
w i t h . o t h e r s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods, may a l l  move a c t o r s  
t o  mobi l ize  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Our d iscuss ion of how t h i s  is 
so ,  c e n t e r s  on s o l i d a r y  groups -- each a  network of  a c t o r s  l inked 
by r e l a t i o n s  t o  be described below, each wi th  broad i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  
c o n f l i c t  a t  key p o i n t s  wi th  those  of o the r  groups, and each with 
members who may be  more o r  less "resourceful ." -  Long run predic-  
t i o n s  about who w i l l  mobil ize what kind of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  can 
only emerge from h i s t o r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  of how economic and geopol i t -  
i c a l  fo rces  ( o f t e n  themselves t h e  outcome of p a s t  c o l l e c t i v e  
. . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . 
a c t i o n )  s t r u c t u r e  and i n t e r r e l a t e  t h e s e  s o l i d a r y  groups. Short  
run  p r e d i c t i o n s  about mobi l i za t ion  can rest on a n a l y s i s  of how 
, p a r t i c u l a r  even t s  confront  s o l i d a r y  groups wi th  concre te  t h r e a t s  
. . -. . and o p p o r t ~ i t i e s ,  how ' they .raise members' . c o n s c ~ o u s n e s i : b f  . '  - . . ' .  . .   . . . 
common i n t e r e s t s ,  and how they r a i s e  group members' l o y a l t y  t o  the  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  who defend common i n t e r e s t s .  
One could t ake  a  set of a c t o r s  t o  be  " a t  r i s k "  t o  mobi l iza t ion  
according t o  the  degree t h a t  they are a  s o l i d a r y  group, t o  the  degree 
t h a t  they face  concre te  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and t h r e a t s  t o  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s ,  
and t o  the  degree t h a t  some r e s o u r c e f u l  a c t o r s  ( i n s i d e  o r  ou t s ide  the  
group) a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  having then? mobil ize.  There is no marked 
threshold  l e v e l  with any of these  f a c t o r s  below which groups a r e  
incapable  of mobil izing.  The same f a c t o r s  t h a t  d e l i m i t  the  p o t e n t i a l  
mobi l izers  a l s o  s e l e c t  the  a c t u a l  mobi l izers .  
Although Olson chose p o t e n t i a l  mobi l izers  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  our 
ob jec t ion  is  l e s s  t o  Olson's choice of groups t o  consider than 
t o  h i s  claim t h a t  want of s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  is what keeps most 
of them from mobil izing.  H e  concludes the book commenting: 
I I . . .  l a r g e  un'organized groups not  only provide evidence f o r  
the  b a s i c  argument of t h i s  study: they a l s o  s u f f e r  i f  i t  is  
true."  They do s u f f e r .  But t h e i r  s i l e n c e  cannot t e l l  us why 
they f a i l  t o  mobil ize.  Unmobilized groups a r e  a problem f o r  . 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  bu t  t h e i r  continued ex i s t ence  cannot be evidence 
f o r  any explanation of i t s e l f .  
The Free Rider Problem 
W e  a r e  persuaded t h a t  c a l c u l a t i o n s  of what may be gained 
and l o s t  through c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n - a r e  very important t o  a c t o r s '  . 
dec i s ions  t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  But contrary  t o  u t i l -  
i t a r i a n  l o g i c ,  w e  t h i n k  t h a t  a c t o r s  a s s e s s  what t h e i r  8roup 
may ga in  o r  l o s e  . a s  w e l l  a s  what they may g a i n  o r  l o s e  a s  indi -  . . . .  . . .  . . _ .  _ - .  . ;. -. . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . : . .  
vidua l s  . 
A t  the  h e a r t  of the  u t i l i t a r i a n  approach t o  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  is the  " f ree  r i d e r "  problem. The idea  is  t h a t  i t  makes 
l i t t l e  sense f o r  an  a c t o r  t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  action.:,when he  
can " r ide  f ree"  on t h e  e f f o r t s  of o the r s .  The f r e e  r i d e r  argu- 
ment is developed, i n  l a r g e  p a r t ,  by the  p u r s u i t  of two 
analogies .  F i r s t ' a n d  foremost, a c t o r s  with common i n t e r e s t s  
, 
a r e  compared t o  f i rms i n  a  competi t ive market. Second,.groups t h a t  do 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  mobil ize a r e  compared t o  governments. Despite s t rong common 
i n t e r e s t s ,  f i rms i n  t h e  competi t tve market don ' t  a c t  c o l l e c t i v e l y .  And 
d e s p i t e  much legi t imacy,  pa t r io t i sm,  and l o y a l t y ,  governments r e l y  on 
coercion t o  r a i s e  revenues and armies. Olson draws t h e  wrong lesson from 
each of these  analogies .  
There is  a  concise  statement of t h e  f i r s t  analogy i n  t h e  argument of 
Olson ' s which we quoted above : 
The r a t i o n a l  ind iv idua l  i n  t h e  economic system does not  c u r t a i l  
h i s  spending t o  prevent i n f l a t i o n  because he  knows, f i r s t ,  t h a t  e 
h i s  own e f f o r t s  would not  have a  no t i ceab le  e f f e c t ,  and second, 
t h a t  h e  would g e t  the  b e n e f i t s  of any p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  
o t h e r s  achieved i n  any case.  For the  same two reasons, the  
r a t i o n a l  ind iv idua l  i n  the  l a r g e  group i n  a  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  
. . . . . .  . . _. " . .  . . .  
contekt  w i l l  not  be  w i l l i n g  t o  make any s a c r i f i c e s  t o  achieve 
the  o b j e c t i v e s  he  sha res  with o t h e r s  ( p .  166).  
We submit . tha t  i t  makes l i t t l e  sense  t o  a t t r i b u t e  t h e  f a i l u r e  of 
. . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . ,. . . . . . .  . ,  . . .  . . - .  . :  .:. , < ' _  
. t h i s  r a t i o n a l '  i nd iv ihua l  t b  c u r t a i l .  spending t o %  t h e  two r e a s o n s  t h a t  
Olson gives .  The ind iv idua l  i s  l i k e l y  t o  have t h e  q u i t e  p l a u s i b l e  expec- 
t a t i o n  t h a t  the re  w i l l  no t  be enough o t h e r  people c u r t a i l i n g  spending to  
produce any e f f e c t .  Olson's reasons become r e l e v a n t  only i f  the  individual  
i s  faced with c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t h a t  s t a n d s  a  chance of success.  By and 
l a r g e ,  i t  is reasonable f o r  the  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  expect  t h a t  the  a c t o r s  who 
share  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  not  mobil ize e f f e c t i v e l y  when they l ack  the  
organizat ion t o  communicate and coordinate  commitments. 
When i t  does seem t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  w i l l  a c t u a l l y  take place 
and may succeed, would-be f r e e  r i d e r s  may p resen t  problems f o r  organizers  
and s tuden t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  How should they be d e a l t  with? Olson's 
answer is  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives ,  b u t  what of ideology, c l a s s  consciousness, 
and s o l i d a r i t y ?  Olson p resen t s  the  analogy of t h e  s t a t e :  
. . .  d e s p i t e  the  fo rce  of p a t r i o t i s m ,  the  appeal  of n a t i o n a l  
ideology, the  bond of a  common c u l t u r e  . . .  no major s t a t e  
i n  modern h i s t o r y  has  been a b l e  t o  support  i t s e l f  through 
. . .  voluntary  dues o r  con t r ibu t ions  (p. 13) 
I f  any l e sson  i s  t o  be  drawn from t h i s  unfor tunate  f a c t ,  i t  i s n ' t  
t h a t  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  a r e  necessary f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion ;  i t  i s  
r a t h e r  t h a t  organizat ions  powerful enough t o  f o r c e  con t r ibu t ions  from 
c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  w i l l  do so.  However, most s o c i a l  movement organizat ions  
a r e  poor i n  the  resources  necessary t o  impose taxes  o r  a  d r a f t .  And 
un l ike  governments, s o c i a l  movements va ry  considerably i n  t h e i r  capaci ty  
t o  t o l e r a t e  f r e e  r i d e r s .  When 300,000 anti-war demonstrators turned out  
. . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . 
f o r  a  march on Washington during the  s i x t i e s ,  they w e r e  no t  hamstrung by 
the  ex i s t ence  of m i l l i o n s  of f r e e  r i d e r s  -- people who wanted t h e  demon- 
s t r a t i o n  t o  be  b i g  and e f f e c t i v e  b u t  d i d n ' t  show up. On t h e  o the r  hand, 
. . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . .  
' ' t h e  ~ o b a c c o  Night Riders had' &ch-'to l o s e  and ' l i t t l e  tb 'g i i in  unless  they.  
could c o n t r o l  t h e i r  f r e e  r i d e r s  -- t h e  farmers who so ld  tobacco d i r e c t l y  
t o  the  tobacco t r u s t  ins tead  of marketing i t  through t h e - P l a n t e r s '  Pro- 
t e c t i v e  Associat ion (see  Gamson, 1975). Free- r i d e r s  .pose d i f f e r e n t  
kinds of problems in d i f f e r e n t  kinds of s t rugg les .  
Some of the  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  a c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ' s  to lerance  
f o r  f r e e  r i d e r s . i n c l u d e  the  c o s t  t o  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  . 
f a i l s ,  the  f r a c t i o n  of the  const i tuency necessary f o r  success,  the  
v i s i b i l i t y  of the  const i tuency 's  boundaries and common i n t e r e s t s ,  the  
amount of middle ground between a c t i v e  suppor t  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  and 
d i r e c t  a i d  t o  i t s  t a r g e t ,  the  degree t o  which t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  good sought 
by the  movement i s  "exclusive,"' and the  degree t o  which f r e e  r i d i n g  
v i o l a t e s  s p e c i f i c  commitments and norms. 
Free r i d e r s  a r e  l e a s t  t o l e r a b l e  i n  a  s t r u g g l e ,  when f a i l u r e  would 
b e  c o s t l y  t o  p a r t i c i p a n t s  and t h e  chances of success  don ' t  amount t o  much 
u n t i l  a  l a r g e  f r a c t i o n  of a r e a d i l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  cons t i tuency i s  mobilized. 
For example, f r e e  r i d e r s  a r e  genera l ly  less t o l e r a b l e  i n  a  s t r i k e  than i n  
a  demonstration. This  i s  s o  r e g a r d l e s s  of whether t h e  mobil izing agent  
i s  a  union, a  p o l i t i c a l  committee, o r  the  l e a d e r s  of a  s o l i d a r y  group. 
The.capaci ty  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  make up f o r  what f r e e  r i d e r s  withold 
v a r i e s  more wi th  the  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e ' s t r u g g l e  than wi th  t h e  group in- 
volved. When the  outcome of a  s t r u g g l e  depends upon t h e  money o rgan ize r s  
can r a i s e  -- perhaps t o  pay f o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  l o b b y i s t s  and campaign con- 
t r i b u t i o n s  -- p a r t i c i p a n t s  can o f t e n  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  make 
. .. . . .  : . . 
up f o r  what is withheld by f r e e  r i d e r s .  But when f r e e  r i d e r s  plague a  
s t r i k e  o r  a  boycot t ,  i t  is  less f e a s i b l e  f o r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  s t r i k e  o r  
boycot t  harder  than i t  i s  f o r  them t o  switch t a c t i c s .  
. . . .. -.: . . ~t makes a d i f f e r e n c e  t o  ' p a r t i c i p a n t s .  whether f r e e  r i d e r s  a r e ,  vio- ... . . ' .  .. . 
l a t i n g  commitments t o  c o n t r i b u t e ,  and whether they a r e  v i o l a t i n g  norms 
a g a i n s t  f r e e  r i d i n g .  W e  suggested above t h a t  expecta t ions  about whether 
o t h e r s  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  a r e  o f t e n  important  t o  assessments of t h e  chances 
t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  may accomplish something worthwhile. Actors  
communicate t h e i r  commitment t o  a c t  i n  order  t o  provide t h e  b a s i s  f o r  
each o t h e r ' s  assessments of what k ind of  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  poss ib le .  
Group norms spec i fy ing  appropr ia t e  conduct f o r  a  s t r i k e ,  o r  a  food r i o t ,  
o r  any c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  a  group's  r e p e r t o i r e  may 
a l s o  provide a  b a s i s  f o r  expec ta t ions  t h a t  o t h e r  group members w i l l  do 
t h e i r  share .  When f r e e  r i d e r s  go back on p r i o r  commitments and v i o l a t e  
norms, they undermine grounds f o r  o t h e r s '  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  and thereby 
th rea ten  t o  set off  a  reverse  bandwagon. 
Like governments, t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  t h a t  a r e  
l e a s t  t o l e r a n t  of c o n s t i t u e n t s  who would r i d e  f o r  f r e e ,  a r e  o f t e n  
those  who must d e a l  wi th  c o n s t i t u e n t s  who would r a t h e r  not  r i d e  a t  a l l .  
The more t h e  bounds of the  const i tuency a r e  f ixed  by "objective1' c r i t e r i a  
-- r a t h e r  than inc lud ing  j u s t  those  a c t o r s  i n  sympathy with the  s o c i a l  
movement -- t h e  more p o s s i b l e  i t  is t h a t  what is  a c o l l e c t i v e  good t o  
some c o n s t i t u e n t s  i s  a c o l l e c t i v e  bad t o  o the rs ,  and what seems l i k e  a 
v i a b l e  s t r a t e g y  t o  some c o n s t i t u e n t s  seems immoral o r  imprac t i ca l  to  
o t h e r s .  A r evo lu t ionary  movement r a i s e s  such problems when i t  extends 
i t s  const i tuency from i t s  sympathizers t o  the  populat ion of some t e r r i t o r y ,  
by claiming t o  be a government. We have a l ready  suggested t h a t  i t  makes 
l i t t l e  sense  t o  invoke u t i l i t a r i a n  l o g i c  t o  account f o r  nonpar t ic ipat ion 
. . . . . . 
when the  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  s tands  l i t t l e  chance of success;  i t  makes j u s t  
a s  l i t t l e  sense  when t h e r e  i s  not  much reason t o  assume nonpar t i c ipan t s  
want t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  good. The assumption t h a t  each a c t o r  pursues only 
: . . . 
'.: :, :' -h is :  own i n t e r e s t s ,  - tends' t o  obscure d i f f e r e n c e s  'between free: r i d i n g ,  . - '  . - . . . . . 
i n e f f i c a c y ,  and i n d i f f e r e n c e  a s  we l i  a s  d i f  f  e r e n c s  i n  how these  separa te  
problems may be handled by organizers .  It impl ies  t h a t  a l l  th ree  problems 
can be solved only when p r i o r  o rgan iza t ions  o r  p o l i t i c a l  "entrepreneurs" 
o f f e r  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives .  
A l l  i n  a l l ,  u t i l i t a r i a n  l o g i c  c o n s t i t u t e s  a bad b a s i s  f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  
var iance  i n  how extens ive  f r e e  r i d i n g  is ,  how t o l e r a b l e  i t  is, and how 
s o c i a l  movement organizat ions  handle i t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  types of s t rugg les  
and d i f f e r e n t  types of cons t i tuenc ies .  U t i l i t a r i a n  l o g i c  s t e e r s  us away 
from s tudying how c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is const ra ined by ordinary  a c t o r s '  
assessments of what their group may gain and lose through alternative 
courses of action. 
~esourceful Actors 
Be they politicians, prophets, business firms, or voluntary associa- 
tions, we call them 'resourceful actors' insofar as each of them has the 
capacity to contribute a significant part of what it takes to bring about 
the collective good. By and large, we share Olson's conviction that the 
mobilization of a large group happens only when it is facilitated by con- 
tributions from resourceful actors. But we differc- with utilitarian ac- 
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counts of how resourceful actors facilitate mobilization, and when they 
decide to do so. 
Olson focuses on long standing organizations which have a surplus of 
resources that they are ready and willing to contribute for the provision 
of a collective good. The surplus is a 'by-product' of past mobilization 
maintained by the ongoing provision of selective incentives. Other utili- 
tarians model the efforts of individual organizers as well as the efforts 
of long standing organizations. Organizers may offer selective incentives 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .even though tliey iack . the: resources 'to prbvide' them right away. Like en-' , . . 
trepreneurs, organizers try to create or pool resources by using their 
skills and connections to convince constituents that they will be able 
to deliver selective incentives in the future (see Frohlich, Oppenheimer, 
and Young, 1971) . 
But often resourceful actors facilitate mobilization without promising 
or providing selective incentives. Particularly in the early stages of 
mobilization, organizers try to convince ordinary constituents not that 
joining in collective action will bring about benefits only for those who 
join, but rather that collective actionwillbring about a collective good. 
Compared to the former kind of influence this latter kind may be produced 
with different and perhaps fewer resources. There are important differ- 
ences between persuading constituents to make an exchange, and persuading 
constituents to make a contribution. Some resources -- money, weapons, 
and printing presses -- may be used in both endeavors,and, these resources 
are often available only if contributed by long standing organizations. 
But resources must be wielded differently if they are being used to back 
up selective incentives than if they are being used for a number of al- 
ternative tasks -- to help constituents understand their common stake in a 
collective good, to alert constituents to threats and opportunities, to 
propose a course of action, to gather and communicate commitments, to or- 
ganize decision making, and to co-ordinate action. In the latter half of 
this paper, we suggest that if these tasks are done well, then in some sit- 
uations many ordinary actors mobilize without selective incentives. 
. . . . 
When do resourceful actors decide to contribute to collective action? 
In Olson's account, they do so when it is likely to get them collective 
I 
goods worth more than the cost of participating, collective goods that 
., wouldn't be forthcoming without their participation. In the complementary ' . . 
account by Frohlich et a1 (1971) 'entrepreneurs' organize collective ac- 
tion when they can expect to get for themselves some of what is to be mo- 
bilized and won through collective action, something worth more than the 
cost of mobilizing. In our account, on the other hand, resourceful actors 
as well as ordinary actors may participate on the basis of solidarity and 
principle . 
Two final points on resourceful actors are worth stressing. When we 
call an organization a 'resourceful actor' we assume that the internal mo- 
bilization and social control of the organization over its members are 
not problematic, a t  l e a s t  no t  f o r  the  purpose of t h e  given inves t iga t ion .  
When an army, a corporat ion,  o r  an a l ready  mobilized p o l i t i c a l  pa r ty ,  
f i g h t s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  goods, they a r e  of i n t e r e s t  here  only i n s o f a r  as 
they a r e  c e n t r a l l y  concerned with the  mobi l iza t ion of ordinary  a c t o r s  
f o r  the  s t rugg le .  Much of Olson's d iscuss ion i s  not  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e o r i e s  
of mobi l iza t ion because it focuses on a c t o r s  f o r  whom mobi l iza t ion has 
become a  rou t ine  matter of o rgan iza t iona l  maintenance. 
Note a l s o  t h a t  much s o c i a l  organizat ion c u r c i a l  t o  mobi l iza t ion is 
informal r a t h e r  than formal. It i s n ' t  easy t o  see how t h e  e f f e c t s  of in-  
formal organizat ion upon mobil izat ion can be understood from the  u t i l i -  
t a r i a n  perspective.  An informal organization--such as a community o r  a  
network of people--cannot be t r e a t e d  a s  an a c t o r  t h a t  sanct ions  people 
according t o  whether o r  not  they j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  I f  a  community 
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o r  network l acks  a  t i g h t  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e ,  each member of t h e  
community o r  network must be taken a s  a decision-maker wi th  ind iv idua l  
- s e l f  i n t e r e s t s .  When informally organized ind iv idua l s  sanct ion would-be 
f r e e  r i d e r s ,  the  sanct ioning is i t s e l f  a  problematic form of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  t h a t  needs t o  be explained. 
We have pointed ou t  a  number of d i f f i c u l t i e s  wi th  Olson's Logic of 
Col lec t ive  Action. U t i l i t a r i a n s  may be tempted t o  escape t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
by so f ten ing  t h e  concept of s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  r a t h e r  than by diminishing 
i ts  r o l e  i n  the  explanation of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  A s s u m e  t h a t  w e  a r e  a l l  
agreed t h a t  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s  people act because i t  would be d i s l o y a l  and 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e  not  t o  a c t .  The problem f o r  s tuden t s  of mobil izat ion then 
becomes how t o  p red ic t  when s o l i d a r i t y  and p r i n c i p l e  w i l l  impel people t o  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
-20- 
Does the concept of selective incentives facilitate this endeavor? 
After all, if people experience satisfactton, guilt, or shame depending 
on whether they join in a worthwhile collective action or ride free, then 
it's simple enough to designate satisfaction, guilt, and shame as potent 
selective incentives. Why not allow moral satisfaction and money to 
count as simply different types of selective incentives? 
To follow this route is to destroy the raison d'etre of the selec- 
4 
tive incentive argument by reducing it to a useless tautology. One 
begins by making it a matter of assumption that people don't participate 
in collective action unless they get something of value for participation. 
Therefore, if one finds no specific good or service that a participant 
receives, one postulates some "soft" selective incentive such as moral 
satisfaction, friendship, alleviation of guilt and the like. 
Under such an approach, any explanation can easily enough be recast 
into a utilitarian framework. Take, for example, the frustration-aggres- 
sion argument. An individual is upset and frustrated about his slow ad- 
vancement in career and turns to collective action that enables him to 
express his pent-up aggression at some handy scapegoat. The pleasure of 
%. 
releasing frustration becomes the selective incentive that the person 
receives for participation. 
To follow this tautological route is to remove the cutting-edge from 
the selective incentive argument. If one blurs together such diverse in- 
centives as satisfaction with participating in a worthwhile cause and some 
specific material inducement, the statement that people participate be- 
cause of selective incentives loses interest. Immediately, one must ask 
whether material incentives or some other kind of incentives are involved. 
Any apparent parsimony in explanation is lost and the idea of selective 
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. incent ives  becomes s o  much excess baggage s i n c e  t h e  weight of explanation 
is  c a r r i e d  by t h e  subsequent d i s t i n c t i o n s  among incen t ives .  
There i s  an a d d i t i o n a l  danger i n  broadening t h e  concept of s e l e c t i v e  
incen t ives  i n  t h i s  fashion.  Although "sof t"  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  a r e  
allowed i n t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n ,  t h i s  f a c t  i s  o f t e n  ignored i n  subsequent a r -  
gument where examples focus on c lea r -cu t ,  m a t e r i a l  incen t ives  . Arguments 
t h a t  may wel l  hold with respec t  t o  a s p e c i f i c  m a t e r i a l  incen t ive  a r e  f r e -  
quent ly  problematic with respec t  t o  non-material incen t ives  but  t h i s  d i f -  
f i c u l t y  is never faced i n  a f o r t h r i g h t  fashion.  
We b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  argument f o r  t h e  va lue  of s e l e c t i v e  
incen t ives  i n  promoting c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  has  some usefulness  but only 
i f  i t  is  defined narrowly. We suggest  t h a t  i t  be l imi ted  t o  inducements 
o r  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  t h a t  is ,  some p o s i t i v e  o r  negat ive  sanc t ion  t h a t  i s  added 
t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  ac to r .  When p a r t i c i p a t i o n  works through some- 
th ing  o t h e r  than sanct ions ,  o the r  concepts a r e  more u s e f u l  than s e l e c t i v e  
incen t ives .  I f  an a c t o r  p a r t i c i p a t e s  because he  f e e l s  t h a t  some s o l i d a r -  
i t y  group wi th  which he  i d e n t i f i e s  is threatened o r  because he f e e l s  re- 
.., . - . s p o n s i b i l i t y  . t o , c o n t r i b u t e  h i s  sha re  t o  g e t t i n g  some c o l l e c t i v e  good, no . . . .  . 
u s e f u l  purpose is served and something of va lue  i s  l o s t  by forc ing such 
considera t ions  i n t o  a u t i l i t a r i a n  mold. The second p a r t  of t h i s  paper 
and t h e  Appendix suggest  an a l t e r n a t i v e  model i n  which s e l e c t i v e  incen- 
t f v e s ,  narrowly def ined,  a r e  given t h e i r  due. 
An A l t e r n a t i v e  Approach t o  Mobi l iza t ion  
So f a r  w e  have c r i t i c i z e d  the  u t i l i t a r i a n  approach t o  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  f o r  exaggerat ing the  r o l e  of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  i n  mobi l iza t ion  while 
obscuring the  r o l e  of s o l i d a r i t y  and p r i n c i p l e .  What do we mean by 
s o l i d a r i t y  and p r i n c i p l e ?  How a r e  they developed, changed, s trengthened? 
How and when do they f a c i l i t a t e  mobi l i za t ion?  I n  the  remainder of the  
paper we d i scuss  these  i s s u e s .  Then i n  the  Appendix, we  p resen t  the  same 
argument more formally.  
Our s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  i s  some const i tuency -- a  s o l i d a r y  group which 
may be  more o r  less s o l i d a r y .  Perhaps some c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r  has  c a l l e d  
upon t h i s  s o l i d a r y  group t o  mobil ize f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  O r  perhaps 
some s o c i a l  a n a l y s t  has i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  group a s  a  populat ion whose pro- 
pens i ty  t o  mobil ize is of i n t e r e s t .  E i t h e r  way, w e  d i scuss  the  con t r ibu t ion  
. of s o l i d a r i t y  a n d . p r i n c i p l e  t o  the  group 's  propensi ty  t o  mobil ize.  
S o l i d a r i t y  
S o l i d a r i t y  is rooted i n  the  conf igura t ion  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  l i n k i n g  
t h e  members of a  group t o  each o t h e r .  People may be  l inked  together  i n  a  
. . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  - 
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number of ways which gehera te  a  sense  of common i d e n t i t y ,  shared f a t e ,  and 
genera l  commitment t o  defend the  group. Drawing on Stinchcombe (1975) 
and Gamson (1968), we sugges t  f i v e  f a c t o r s  which c o n s t i t u t e  the b a s i s  f o r  
a  person 's  s o l i d a r i t y  wi th  a  group: 
a ,  Fr iends  a n d , r e l a t i v e s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a  person has  
f r i e n d s  and r e l a t i v e s  wi th in  the  group, and t o  the  e x t e n t  
t h a t  he is  i n d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  o t h e r s  i n  the  group 
through t h e i r  f r i e n d s h i p  and k insh ip  with h i s  f r i e n d s  
and k in ,  he has  a  b a s i s  f o r  s o l i d a r i t y  with the  group. 
b.  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  organizat ions .  To the e x t e n t  t h a t  a  
person a c t s  c o l l e c t i v e l y  with o the r  members of the  group 
i n  productive o rgan iza t ions ,  voluntary  assoc ia t ions ,  
c lubs ,  and o t h e r  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  he has a b a s i s  f o r  s o l i -  
d a r i t y  wi th  the  group. 
c .  Design f o r  l i v i n g .  Groups f requent ly  o f f e r  members a 
set of techniques f o r  handling the problems they en- 
counter i n  t h e i r  d a i l y  l i v e s  -- problems l i k e  f ind ing  and 
keeping a good job and a good spouse, making f r i e n d s ,  
r a i s i n g  ch i ld ren ,  s t ay ing  o u t  of t rouble ,  and g e t t i n g  
t r e a t e d  wi th  d i g n i t y  and r e s p e c t .  I n  t r y i n g  t o  implement 
some des ign f o r  going through l i f e ,  a  person may r e l y  t o  
a g r e a t e r  o r  lesser degree on support  from o t h e r  people 
and o rgan iza t ions  i n  the  s o l i d a r y  group. To the  e x t e n t  
t h a t  a  person 's  design f o r  l i v i n g  is  shared and supported 
by other  group members more than by o u t s i d e r s ,  he has  a 
b a s i s  f o r  s o l i d a r i t y  with t h e  group. 
d. Subordinate and superordinate  r e l a t i o n s .  To the  e x t e n t  
. . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  : .  . . .  , . . . .  . . .  . . . . , .  
t h a t  a  person shares  w i t h  o t h e r  group members t h e  same 
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set of subordinate  and superordinate  r e l a t i o n s  wi th  out- 
s i d e r s ,  he  has  a b a s i s  f o r  s o l i d a r i t y  with the  group. 
e. No e x i t .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a person i s  r e a d i l y  i d e n t i f i e d  
and o f t e n  t r e a t e d  a s  a member of the  group, and e x i t  from 
the group is  d i f f i c u l t ,  he has  a b a s i s  f o r  s o l i d a r i t y  with 
the  group. 
A person whose l i f e  i s  in ter twined with the  group i n  these  ways has 
a b i g  s t ake  i n  the  group's  f a t e .  When c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is urgent ,  the 
person is l i k e l y  t o  con t r ibu te  h i s  o r  h e r  share even i f  the impact of 
t h a t  share  i s  no t  no t i ceab le .  Our argument, . then,  is  t h a t  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
charac te r i zed  above genera te  s o l i d a r i t y  and t h a t  t h i s  becomes an important 
b a s i s  f o r  mobi l iza t ion.  
Can an organizer  c r e a t e  o r  s t r eng then  a network of s o l i d a r y  r e l a t i o n s  
wi th in  a const i tuency? The s o l i d a r i t y  of a const i tuency must o f t e n  be 
taken by o rgan ize r s  a s  the  enduring r e s u l t  of long run h i s t o r i c a l  forces .  
I n  the  s h o r t  run i t  is  hard  t o  c r e a t e  s o l i d a r y  r e l a t i o n s  wi th in  an aggre- 
ga te  of unconnected ind iv idua l s ;  i t  is  even hard t o  i n t e n s i f y  s o l i d a r i t y  
where i t  a l ready  e x i s t s .  So experienced organizers  pay a t t e n t i o n  t o  the  
dens i ty  and q u a l i t y  of s o l i d a r y  r e l a t i o n s  wi th in  a const i tuency when 
assess ing  i t s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  mobi l iza t ion.  When a const i tuency l acks  
s o l i d a r i t y ,  mobi l iza t ion e f f o r t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a i l .  
A r e c e n t  a r t i c l e  by Burlingham (1977) desc r ibes  the  e f f o r t s  of the  
Rhode I s l a n d  Workers Associat ion (RIWA) t o  organize the  unemployed. H e  
quotes a t  length  from one of RIWA1s p ro fess iona l  o rgan ize r s ,  George Nee: 
You have t o  th ink of the  glue t h a t  holds  a group together .  
W e  were organiz ing people around being unemployed. Well, 
. _ .  . . . . . . . 
. . .  - . . being 'me&loy& ; i i . ' n o t  p a r t  of 'A person1 s i d e n t i t y . - -  l i k e  ' .- . '. . .  . 
being on welfare ,  o r  being a worker, o r  being a member of 
an e t h n i c  group. They d idn ' t  th ink  of themselves a s  unem- 
ployed. They d i d n ' t  r e a l l y  i d e n t i f y  wi th  o the r  people who 
were unemployed. The only l o c a l  chapters  t h a t  took hold 
had o t h e r  f a c t o r s  going f o r  them. The East  Bay group was 
mainly made up of Portuguese immigrants. West Warwick is 
an o ld ,  white working-class a rea ,  a cohesive community with 
high unemployment. And i n  both cases  organizers  emerged from 
the  l o c a l  communities. That didn' t happen elsewhere (pp. 20-21). 
When working wi th in  a  low-sol idar i ty  const i tuency,  organizers  tend 
t o  focus t h e i r  e f f o r t s  on the  a c t o r s  who are most c e n t r a l  t o  whatever 
s o l i d a r y  networks do e x i s t .  Sometimes people who a r e  c e n t r a l  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
networks wi th in  a  const i tuency can be brought together  t o  share  experiences 
and develop a  b a s i s  f o r  cooperation. Kahn (1970, page 35) suggests  tha t  
"The o rgan ize r  use . . .  techniques t o  b r i n g  together  those people he 
f e e l s  need t o  know each o the r  i n  the  sense  of shar ing together  the  exper- 
iences  and conversat ions they have shared with him." 
I f  o rgan ize r s  a r e  bu i ld ing  f o r  a  long s t r u g g l e ,  they have much t o  
gain  by undertaking the  d i f f i c u l t  process  of s t rengthening so l ida ry  re la -  
t i o n s  wi th in  the  consti tuency.  Clubs and voluntary  a s s o c i a t i o n s  may be 
formed, encouraged, and l inked to  each o t h e r .  C u l t u r a l  events can promote 
t h e  group's  "design f o r  l iv ing";  while c o l l e c t i v e  goods may be provided 
which make the  "design" work f o r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  i n  t h e i r  d a i l y  l i v e s .  Some 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  may be organized less because of t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
winning c o l l e c t i v e  goods d i r e c t l y  and.more f o r  the  s o l i d a r i t y  they a r e  
l i k e l y  t o  produce. S o c i a l  events,  even r i t u a l s ,  can be  use fu l  i n  s t rength-  
ening the s o l i d a r y  r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  he lp  t o  s u s t a i n  a  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r  
. . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  - . . ,  . . .  . . _  . . :. , . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . 
during quiescent  t i m e s  a n d  then f a c i l i t a t e  r a p i d  mobi l iza t ion when collec-  
t i v e  a c t i o n  is urgent .  It should be one of t h e  empir ica l  t a sks  of research 
from the  resource  mobi l iza t ion pe rspec t ive  t o  i d e n t i f y  what s t r a t e g i e s  
a r e  most u s e f u l  under what condi t ions  f o r  inc reas ing  s o l i d a r i t y .  
Group I n t e r e s t s  
Sol idary  groups have i n t e r e s t s ,  some i n t e n s e  and o t h e r s  l e s s  so. I n  
any given c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion ,  there  may be more o r  less a t  s t a k e  f o r  a  
c o n s t i t u e n t  s o l i d a r y  group. Strengthening a  person 's  t i e s  t o  a  s o l i d a r y  group 
boosts  h i s  propensi ty  t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  only insofa r  a s  the  
group has  much a t  s t ake  i n  the  f a t e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  So how do we 
determine a  group 's i n t e r e s t s ?  
When assess ing  a group's s h o r t  run prospects  f o r  mobilizing, w e  look 
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a t  t h e  group's sub jec t ive  i n t e r e s t s .  The group has  a sub jec t ive  i n t e r e s t  
i n  whatever c o l l e c t i v e  goods a r e  bel ieved by group members t o  a f f e c t  t h e i r  
chances of having what they most a r d e n t l y  t r y  t o  g e t ,  say they want, and . 
claim they deserve. So, w e  i n f e r  s 'ubject ive i n t e r e s t s  from t h e  primary 
p u r s u i t s  of t h e  group's leading a c t o r s ,  t h e  goals  they a r t i c u l a t e ,  and the  
p r i n c i p l e s  embedded i n  the  group's design f o r  l i v i n g .  
When assess ing  a group's long run prospects  f o r  mobil izing,  w e  must 
consider  both t h e  group's cu r ren t  s u b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  and i t s  ob jec t ive  
, i n t e r e s t s .  The group can be assumed t o  have an o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  i n  a 
c o l l e c t i v e  good t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  the  good promotes t h e  long run wealth 
and power of t h e  group and t h e  v i a b i l i t y  of i t s  design f o r  l i v i n g  (whether 
o r  .not t h e s e  consequences a r e  know t o  group members). Objective i n t e r e s t s  
e x e r t  an important in f luence  o n . s u b j e c t i v e  ones. The former a r e  more endur- 
ing;  t h e  l a t t e r  a f f e c t  mobi l iza t ion more d i r e c t l y .  The former a r e  most , 
:. - . .  : 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  take  i n t o  account. But t h e  longer  t h e  t i m e  frame under con- 
s i d e r a t i o n ,  the  more necessary i t  i s  t o  do so.  
How do t h e  interests of a  s o l i d a r y  group ge t  l inked  t o  a program of 
. . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . " . . .  . . . .  . z : . ~ o l l e c t i v ~ : '  ac t ion? '  There .-are s e v e r a l  ways that- a ' c o l l & c t i v e  'ac tor  I& 
i d e n t i f y  its program with cons t i tuen t s  ' group i n t e r e s t s  , and thereby har- 
ness  c o n s t i t u e n t s '  s o l i d a r i t y  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  Sometimes a s o c i a l  
movement emerges through the  ac t ions  of t h e  l eaders  of a  long-standing 
s o l i d a r y  group. S o c i a l  movement s t r u c t u r e  is then coextensive with t h e  ' 
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  consti tuency.  I f  such a movement produces a formal or- 
ganizat ion with a concrete program, c o n s t i t u e n t s  a r e  ap t  t o  support  the  
program' and be  l o y a l  t o  t h e  organizat ion ' r i g h t  away. The counterrevdlution 
i n  t h e  ~ e n d g e  appears t o  have been such 
a movement. It spread quickly  and d ramat ica l ly  a s  s o l i d a r y  groups i n  the  
r eg ion  i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  i t ,  and f e l t  t h a t  the  v i a b i l i t y  of t h e i r  design f o r  c 
l i v i n g  hinged on i t s  f a t e  (see  T i l l y ,  1964). I n  such a case ,  t h e  movement 
o rgan iza t ion  appears t o  be  the  arm of i t s  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  f i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e i r  
common i n t e r e s t s .  
But what do s o c i a l  movement o rgan ize r s  do when they a r e  no t  the  
longstanding l e a d e r s  of t h e i r .  c o n s t i t u e n t  s o l i d a r y  group, and when t h e i r  
goa l s  do no t  j i b e  w i t h  t h e  group's s u b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s ?  Then they may 
acqu i re  s o l i d a r y  group suppor t  more d e l i b e r a t e l y ,  by one of two paths .  
F i r s t ,  they can woo t h e  s o l i d a r y  group. They can she lve  t h e i r  u l t ima te  
goa l s  and develop a program t h a t  is  c l o s e r  t o  t h e  group's  s u b j e c t i v e  in- 
terests (o r  they can appear t o  do s o ) ;  they can bargain  f o r  support  with 
t h e  group's  l e a d e r s ,  and they can t r y  t o  " r a i s e  t h e  consciousness" of 
key a c t o r s  wi th in  t h e  group s o  a s ' t o  move i t  i n  l i n e  wi th  t h e  movement. 
. . . . . :  
But t h i s  pa th  i s  no t  always f e a s i b l e .  Perhaps t h e  cons t i tuency 's  
p u r s u i t s  and p r i n c i p l e s  are incompatible wi th  those  of t h e  organizers .  
Perhaps t h e  l e a d e r s  of t h e  cons t i tuency oppose c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  o u t r i g h t ,  
: Cons t i tuen t s  who j o i n  i n  . c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  may f a c e  l o s s  o f :  support  from. .. ' 
t h e i r  s o l i d a r y  group. I n  . t h i s  kind of s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  o rgan ize r s  may t r y  
. t o  make t h e  movement i t s e l f  t h e  locus  of a network of s o l i d a r y  r e l a t i o n s .  
There may be  d e l i b e r a t e  e f f o r t s  t o  promote a "design f o r  l i v i n g "  wi th  
suppor t ing  i n s t i t u t i o n s  more compatible wi th  the  organizers '  program. 
On t h i s  second path ,  o rgan ize r s  s i d e s t e p  t h e  co re  l e a d e r s  of the  
o l d  s o l i d a r y  group along wi th  t h e i r  c l o s e  a f f i l i a t e s ,  whi le  wooing more 
sympathetic subgroups. By and l a r g e ,  t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  of a cons t i tuency 
is  uneven; and t h e r e  may w e l l  be subgroups i n  some c o n f l i c t  wi th ,  o r  iso-  
l a t i o n  from, i ts  dominant a c t o r s .  Organizers  may appeal  t o  a subgroup by 
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accommodating their program to subgroup interests. Perhaps they can for- 
mulate and advance demands on issues of particular concern to the sub- 
group. If subgroup members can be attracted to.the movement on the basis 
of principle or common interest, they may develop loyalty to the movement 
as they develop solfdary relations among its supporters. 
This second path to social movement mobilization -- that of forging 
new solidary relations rather than harnessing old ones -- bears some re- 
semblance to that posited by mass society theory. Though many of the so- 
cial movements which concern us emerge from longstanding solidary groups 
whose interests clash with those of authorities, here we consider move- 
ments which must await (or bring about) the weakening of certain solidary 
relations that block collective action. We recognize, then, that some 
configurations of solidary relations cross cut and interlock classes, 
races, and religions; and we recognize that some cohesive solidary groups 
encourage their members to accept certain ongoing forms of oppression. 
Historical forces that weaken such solidarities may increase a population's 
propensity to collective action. We also recognize that a social move- 
ment may offer a refuge for people who abandon or are abandoned by their 
prior solidary groups. 
Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between our argument ' 
here and various "breakdown" theories of collective action, including 
mass society theory. We assume that people who drift without solidary 
relations, without firm principles, anxious, atomized, anomic -- such 
people are unlikely to mobilize for collective action. Even the social 
movement's least rooted in prior solidary groups are less likely to at- 
tract drifters than principled actors who have stable inte.rests in the 
collective goods sought by the movement. 
To align a program of collective action with the interests of con- 
stituents, organizers need to understand constituents. To mobilize through 
'networks of solidary relations amotfg constituents, organizers need to earn 
constituents' trust. So it helps if organizers can fit in with their 
solidary networks and understand their experiences. Alinsky advises us 
that "Since people understand only in terms of their own experience, an 
organizer must have at least a cursory familiarity with their experience. 
It not only serves communication, but it strengthens the personal identi- 
fication of the organizer with the others" (1971, page 84). Or, to quote 
Kahn : 
In some ways, the organizer's main job in the community in the 
early stages of organizing is simply to make friends with the 
people there . . . Generally, an effective organizer will have a 
good deal in common with the people he is working among. In the 
mountains of North'Carolina, for example, it helps to know a lot 
about fishing, hunting, pulpwooding, farming, trucks, country 
music, raising tobacco, shotguns, dogs,.and religion . . . If 
an ' organizer does 'not': share knowledge .and experiences 'kith the -. 
people he is working among, he will have a hard time communicating . 
with them (1970, pp. 5, 26). 
For similar reasons, the O.M. Collective suggests that organizers gain 
advantages in working with their own "age, class, and occupational group" 
(19.71, page 38). It should be one of the empirical tasks of resource 
mobilization theory to identify what strategies in what situations work 
best to align the program of a social movement with the interests of a 
solidary constituency. 
I 
Personal Interest in Collective Goods 
Not only do solidary groups have interests, but individuals also 
have interests in the preservation or achievement of various collective 
goods. They may have various reasons for valuing these collective 
goods -- some of them selfish and some quite altruistic. These valuations 
may be identical to those of their most important solidary groups, or, in 
some cases, they may disagree. 
There is a particularly relevant sub-set of collective goods for 
the mobilization process. Certain collective goods may be perceived as 
an entitlement, as something deserved as a matter of justice, equity, or 
right. We propose to use the term "principles" to refer to this sub-set. 
Collective actors frequently attempt to appeal to the principles of 
their constituents as a way of mobilizing support. They approach them 
with some vision of justice or equity with which they hope to raise some 
righteous anger. Discontent needs to be focused and channeled; the con- 
nections between proximate events and more abstract states of the system 
must be developed. Political education, ideological discussion, study 
groups, consciousness-raising . . sessions, newsletters.and political tracts ,. _ .  .. . _ .  , . . . . . .  .. . . . 
frequently are intended to raise personal interest in the collective 
goods being promoted. 
People's allegiance to the goals of a collective actor cannot be 
taken for granted as arising spontaneously from their social conditions. 
Alinsky (1971) advises us that: 
Men don't like to step abruptly out of the security of familiar 
experience; they need a bridge across from their own experience 
to a new way. A revolutionary organizer must shake up the pre- 
vailing pattern of their lives - agitate, create disenchantment 
and discontent with the current values, to produce, if not a 
passion for. change, at least a passive, affirmative non-challenging 
climate (page xxi). 
Other professional organizers offer similar advice against assuming 
support for the purpose of collective action. The O.M. Collective points 
out that "Few people see themselves as abstractly 'oppressed' although 
they are acutely aware of the daily struggle to eat, make-a happy home, 
educate their.kids, keep their draft age boys alive, hold some hope for 
.the future -- in short, to live like human beings" (1971, page 40). 
Wernette (1976) suggests that: 
There are a number of ways in which the value of a collective good 
can be increased for the individual. One such way entails linking 
the collective good to other collective goods by means of an ideo- 
logical analysis . . .  In addition, the individual, by seeing the 
sacrifices made by others in contributing to the provisions of the 
collective good, notes the value of the good to them (1976, page 
There is no magic formula for raising the value of the collective 
good, but imaginative mobilizing agents are constantly looking for oppor- 
tunities to do it. Sometimes events occur that present mobilizing agents 
with consciousness raising opportunities. Sometimes they can stage their 
own events or actions. Yippie activities, such as throwing dollar bills 
on members of the New York Stock Exchange or guerrilla theatre have such 
a purpose. The aim of guerrilla theatre, the O.M. Collective argues: 
. . .  is to create a metaphor or symbolic revelation of reality 
that will force people to see and to think about the world in new 
ways. The metaphor seizes upon the essence of everyday events and, 
through exaggeration, distortion, and change of context, strips 
them of their familiar aspects -- "blows them up" to expose the 
shocking truths within (page 73). 
I 
It should be one of the empirical tasks of resource mobilization theory 
to identify what strategies and tactics are most useful under what con- 
ditions for raising personal interest in collective goods. 
The Urgency of Collective Action 
Hobilization is more likely when collective action is more urgent. 
Urgency is a straightforward function of necessity and opportunity. What- 
ever events lower the chances that constituents can realize their inter- 
ests without collective action, thereby raise the necessity for collective 
action. Whatever events raise the chances that collective action can 
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successfully promote or protect constituents' interests, thereby raise the 
opportunity for collective action. 
Collective action, then, is most urgent when there is no reason to 
. . .  . .- . -  . . .. .. . . . . 
believe that collective goods will be preserved without cdllective action, 
and every reason to believe that they can be preserved through collective 
action. We say "preserved" without adding "or brought about" only to 
suggest that many constituencies, especially ones that are poor and poorly 
organized, have a stronger subjective interest in protecting existing col- 
lective goods than in winning new ones. But once the strength of a group's 
interest in a collective good is given, we mean "urgency" to be not a 
matter of whether the group already has the good, but rather a matter of 
the difference collective action will make to constituents' chances of 
having it in the future. (See the Appendix for a more formal treatment of . 
these issues. ) 
Here we mention some ways that various events can affect the neces- 
sity and opportunity for collective action. Sometimes organizers can only 
prepare for such events and await them. Other times it is possible to pre- 
cipitate them. 
1. Necessity 
What kind of events lower the chances that constituents can realize 
their interests without collective action? Unfortunately for those who 
want to predict mobilization, new threats to group interests can come from 
just about anywhere (within broad limits set by the nature of the group 
and the political economy of its environment). Authorities can break 
commitments to the group, reverse policies that were beneficial, and form 
alliances with the group's enemies. Authorities can repress the group's 
organizations and leaders. The collective action of outsiders can threat- 
en to damage some state of affairs that the group has a stake in conserv- 
ing. Employers can speed up the work process, tighten discipline, cut 
wages, fire militants. When ongoing processes erode constituents' ac- 
cess to jobs, markets; land, or whatever else they need to secure a 
livelihood, particular events epitomizing the deteriorating situation can 
be especially threatening. 
If events can increase the necessity of collective action by posing 
direct threats to specific group interests, events can also increase the 
necessity of collective action more diffusely by reducing constituents' 
trust in authorities. Authorities often pretend to be above conflicts of 
interest among various groups under their rule. They claim to have the 
intention and capacity to provide collective goods that benefit everyone 
by benefitting the whole country. The extent to which people believe such 
claims varies considerably, over time and between constituencies. Some- 
times when agents of authority support the group's enemies, restrict the 
group's access to government protection and welfare services, and other- 
wise violate the group's principles of justice, group members still trust 
that higher authorities will rectify the situation. No matter how seri- 
ously their interests are threatened, the actors in a constituency may 
fail to mobilize until they lose the trust that authorities will take 
care of things sooner or later. So the necessity of collective action 
can be raised by events which display authorities'bad faith, and high- 
light their conflicts of interest with constituents. 
It is just such reasoning that leads Lenin to call strikes "a 
school of war:" I 
A strike . . . opens the eyes of the workers to the nature, not 
only of the capitalists, but of the government and laws as well . . . 
Soldiers are even ordered to fire on the workers and whentheykill 
unarmed workers by shooting the fleeing crowd in the back, the 
tsar himself sends the troops an expression of gratitude. . . . 
. . 
.. .. . . . . , - ' It becnnes clear to &&ry worker that the tsarist gbvern&nt is . . . . . 
his worst enemy, since it defends the capitalists and binds the 
workers hand and foot (1960, IV, pp. 31'6-17). 
A collective action under consideration may be only one of several 
alternative courses of action, each advocated by a rival collective 
actor within the constituency. The necessity for supporting soine social 
movement organization may be low if an established interest group can be 
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relied upon to protect group interests, or if a rival social movement 
organization is more viable. NAACP, CORE, SNCC, SCLC, as well as a 
number of others, offered various alternative courses of action to 
American blacks during the 1960s. Each tried to mobilize support from 
somewhat different subgroups within the black community and from some- 
what different sources outside the black community; and they sometimes 
coordinated their activities. Still, to a substantial degree these col- 
lective actors were rivals. The necessity of joining with any particular 
collective actor is reduced by whatever increases the prospects of rival 
collective actors. 
In sum, the necessity of some collective action is increased by 
eyents which Shreaten the interests of its constituents, undermine their 
trust in authorities, and discredit rival possibilities of collective ac- 
tion. Organizers try to predict when such events will happen in order to 
get constituents ready for them. Organizers may also try to precitipate 
these events, but they must act discreetly in order not to discredit 
themselves. Constituents are unlikely to appreciate the organizer who 
deliberately creates threats to their interests to get them to mobilize. 
Discrediting rivals may undermine the chances of forming a useful coali- 
tion; and destroying trust in authorities can have delicate consequences 
for bargaining with them. Regardless of who precipitates these events, 
when they happen organizers try to point out the necessity for collective 
action. It should be one of the empirical tasks of research from the re- 
source mobilization perspective to identify what strategies in what situa- 
tions best raise constituents' consciousness of this necessity, if not 
the necessity itself. 
2. Opportunity 
What kind of events:raise the chances that constituents can realize 
their interests through collective action? As with necessity, there are 
multiple sources of opportunity. First, a collective actor may create its 
own opportunities by establishing its credibility and effectiveness in the 
eyes of the constituency. Opportunity is created when a given.collective 
actor convinces members of its constituency that its proposed collective 
action is viable and can produce some results. Potential participants 
want to know whether the actor who proposes collective action should be 
taken seriously as an instrument, whether it is a potentially efficacious 
organization. The calculus the person makes is whether the collective 
actor is serious, honorable, dedicated, tough, determined, wise, or 
whatever else is deemed necessary for success in producing the collective 
good. 
Low collective efficacy is a central problem in efforts to orga- 
nize the oppressed, and those in the business of doing this have many 
suggestions to offer on dealing with it. The basic strategy is to demon- 
strate influence by picking a target that offers promise of a quick suc- 
cess, thus showing potential constituents that the social movement actor 
is one to be reckoned.with and that opportunities exist for collective 
action. . "The..organizer knows," Alinsky writes (1971, page 113) . ., . > :.., c 
" . . . that his biggest job is to give the people the feeling they can 
do something." 
How does one accomplish this? The O.M. Collective tells us that 
"It is 4esirable to make the first organized project of the group a short 
term one that has a high .probabil'ity of success," that "Your first issue 
should be an attainable goal which will provide you with your first vic- 
tory," and "Try to keep tangible, though perhaps small, victories coming 
as well as continuous action and progress on longer-term work" (1971, pp. 
4, 15, 16). Ross (1973), advising us in how to conduct Naderite citizen 
a c t i o n  groups, remarks t h a t  "The i n i t i a l  p r o j e c t s  should be small ,  spe- 
c i f i c ,  and achievable;" Kopkind (1977, page 28) desc r ibes  the  s t r a t e g y  
of t h e  F a i r  Share o rgan iza t ion  i n  Massachuset ts :  
Following good neighborhood organiz ing s t r a t e g y ,  F a i r  Share con- 
c e n t r a t e d  on small v i c t o r i e s  a t  t h e  l o c a l  l e v e l :  t a x  abasements i n  
Dorchester ,  b r idge  r e p a i r s  i n  Eas t  Boston, a  dump r e l o c a t i o n  i n  
Worcester. Those i s s u e s  d i d  what organiz ing is  supposed t o  do: 
engage people i n  work t h a t  teaches  them something about power, 
about s t r u g g l e ,  about l eader sh ip  . . . The a c t i o n s  were picked 
t o  be  winnable "by t h e  most powerless people,  . . . i n  t h e  most 
m i l i t a n t  fashion,"  one F a i r  Share worker s a i d .  
Building t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r  is  only one a i p e c t  
of inc reas ing  oppor tun i ty . -  Disar ray  i n  t h e  t a r g e t  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
can d ramat ica l ly  i n c r e a s e  chances f o r  s u c c e s s f u l  c o l l e c t i v e  action: Some- 
t i m e s  e x t e r n a l  events  -- a war o r  economic c r i s i s  -- w i l l  l eave  a t a r g e t  
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  an  e s p e c i a l l y  vu lne rab le  s t a t e .  Sometimes i n t e r -  
. . 
. . . . . . . . . n a l  c o n f l i c t  wil l .become s o  a c u t e  t h a t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of e f f e c t i v e  . ' . !. . 
counter  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r  become g r e a t l y  diminished. * 
Trotsky desc r ibes  such a s i t u a t i o n  a s  one of t h e  " p o l i t i c a l  prem- 
ises of a  revolut ion1' :  
The r u l i n g  c l a s s e s ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  of t h e i r  p r a c t i c a l l y  manifested 
incapac i ty  t o  g e t  the  country ou t  of i t s  b l i n d  a l l e y ,  l o s e  f a i t h  
i n  themselves; the  o l d  p a r t i e s  f a l l  t o  p i e c e s ,  a b i t t e r  s t r u g g l e  
of groups and c l i q u e s  p r e v a i l s ;  hopes a r e  placed i n  mi rac les  o r  
mi rac le  workers (1959, page 311). 
Finally, .opportunity may be raised by the actions of coalition 
partners and third party supporters. When others plan actions or lend 
support to a collective actor, new possibilities for collective action 
may become available through the aggregation of resources involved. 
Lipsky (1970) and Schattschneider (1960) have been particularly attentive 
to this aspect of opportunity. 
In sum, the opportunity for collective action is increased by 
events that raise the credibility of the collective actor, throw its 
antagonists into disarray, and make available coalition partners and 
third party support. As with necessity, organizers attempt to anticipate 
such events so that they are prepared to take advantage of them. They 
,may also attempt to precipitate them, a less delicate matter than precip- 
itating increases in necessity. Increasing opportunity does not require . 
the same discretion. Regardless of who or what precipitates the events, 
organizers try to point out increased opportunities for collective action. 
It should be one of the empirical tasks of research from the resource 
mobilization perspective to identify what strategies in what situatgons 
. . . . 
. .  . . . 
. . . . . -.. raise constituents' consciousness of opportunities. for cqllective action. ' . '  . . 
as well as the opportunities themselves. 
Loyalty and Responsibility 
In the Appendix to this paper, we suggest how the variables dis- 
cussed combine to produce mobilization for collective action. Two dif- 
ferent mechanisms operate, one acting through people's loyalty to a group 
with which they experience solidarity, and the other acting through 
people's responsibility to personal principles which are at stake in 
collective action. 
When group interest, solidarity, and urgency combine, we may 'talk 
about people a s  being a c t i v a t e d  by l o y a l t y .  When pe r sona l  i n t e r e s t  i n  
c o l l e c t i v e  goods, e s p e c i a l l y  those  w e  have c a l l e d  p r i n c i p l e s ,  combines 
wi th  urgency, w e  may t a l k  about a  person a s  being a c t i v a t e d  by responsi- 
b i l i t y .  Note t h a t  urgency i s  a  p a r t  of both  combinations. W e  argue t h a t  
the  c a l l  on e i t h e r  l o y a l t y  o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  is  g r e a t e r  when t h e  urgency 
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is  increased.  
It is u s e f u l  t o  th ink  of l o y a l t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  n o t  merely a s  
a t t r i b u t e s  of i n d i v i d u a l s  b u t  a s  p r o p e r t i e s  of c u l t u r a l  codes o r  b e l i e f  
systems. Ind iv idua l s  e x i s t  i n  a  c l ima te  wi th  c u l t u r a l  b e l i e f s  about 
one 's  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  those  groups wi th  which one i d e n t i f i e s  and the  re- 
s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  one ' s  s h a r e  t o  j u s t  causes.  Some ind iv idua l s  
w i l l  have i n t e r n a l i z e d  t h e s e  b e l i e f s  more than o t h e r s ,  and t h e  content  
and s t r e n g t h  of t h e s e  b e l i e f s  may d i f f e r  by c u l t u r e  and sub-culture. 
Nevertheless,  w e  expect  cons ide ra t ions  of l o y a l t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
b e  important ,because t h e r e  are c e r t a i n  c e n t r a l  components i n  l o y a l t y  and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  codes t h a t  a r e  widely shared,  r ega rd less  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
p r i n c i p l e s ,  e t h i c a l  b e l i e f s ,  o r  r e l i g i o n  on which they are based. These 
inc lude  . , an expec ta t ion  t h a t  people w i l l  . c o n t r i b u t e  some s h a r e  when groups . . .. 
. . .  . . . . .  
with  whose f a t e  they a r e  l inked  have a  b i g  s t a k e  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  and 
t h a t  they w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  some s h a r e  t o  s e e  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  they hold 
dear  a r e  r e a l i z e d .  
The demands of l o y a l t y  and t h e  demands of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  happily 
coincide  much of t h e  time. However, they  may on occasion diverge.  The 
hallmark of l o y a l i s t  behavior ,  a s  Hirschman (1970) no tes ,  is t h e  commit- 
ment t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  a  group i n  s p i t e  of disagreement wi th  i t .  Loyalty 
becomes manifest  and d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  when t h e  two 
promote opposi te  tugs  -- when people f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  p r i n c i p l e s  c o n f l i c t  
with the group's interest as it defines it. Such principled opposition 
may, of course, claim to represent the group's "true" interest in resist- 
ing the call to honor the group's discipline. 
Self-Interest Revisited 
In this final section of the paper, we return to a consideration of 
the individual costs and benefits which affect constituents' propensity to 
join in collective action. We do not suggest that actors ignore what they 
have to gain and lose individually when deciding whether to support col- 
lective action. Such considerations are important, sometimes decisive, 
but in ways that tend to be obscured by utilitarian logic and the con- 
ceptual imagery of economics. Some of these ways are even awkward to 
discuss in the language of "goods1' and "costs," but we try to do so in 
order to confront the utilitarian argument more directly. 
In any constituency, the cost of collective action per actor may be 
reduced over time by a number of historical forces. If, for example, the 
constituency is a social class and the collective good is control of the 
state, the cost per-constituent of the good goes d m  as the number of 
actors in the class increases, their control of strategic resources in- 
creases, their access to support from outside parties increases, the re- 
pressive power of authorities declines, and so forth. McCarthy and Zald 
(1973) point out how the mobilization of social movement organizations in 
America has been facilitated by increases in the income and discretionary 
time of people in many constituencies, and by increases in the size of a 
liberal conscience constituency with particularly high levels of income 
and discretionary time. Clearly, the cost to a constituent of giving $50 
and fifty hours is more when he or she earns$5,000a year working forty 
fixed hours each week, than when he or she earns $25,000 a year with much 
discretion on when and how much to work. 
Regardless of changes in the income and occupational structure of 
the constituency, and the political economy of its environment, joining 
in collective action still involves significant costs. Good organizers 
do their best to reduce them. Sanctioning potential constituents -- pro- 
viding selective incentives -- is only one way to reduce or offset costs. 
First, we consider some of the other ways of reducing costs. Next, we 
consider how the effectiveness of many selective incentives provided by 
social movement organizers is primarily dependent upon constituents' soli- 
darity, their principles, and the viability of collective action. And, 
finally, we delimit the situations in which the concept "selective incen- 
tives" seems most appropriate to characterize important determinants of 
social movement mobilization. 
. . 
Reducing ~osts'without Selective Incentives 
,I. Entrepreneurs, inventors, and engineers strive, often success- 
fully, to reduce the cost of producing various economic goods and ser- 
- . . . vices, Likewise, a foremost task .of organizers is to search -for more e£- . . 
ficient ways of bringing about the collective good. If they succeed, 
they reduce the amount that constituents must contribute. By distilling 
their own experiences, learning from others ' experiences, and developing 
theoretical understanding of their historical situation, organizers can assess 
opportunities and perhaps discover ways of creating opportunities. Many 
' activists spend much time planning and arranging so that it will be less 
costly for constituents to pool resources, attend meetings, demonstrate, 
petition, and otherwise participate. 
2.  When organizers provide constituents with goods and services, 
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these are often collective goods rather than selective incentives. A num- 
I 
ber of antiwar groups, for example, provided draft counseling. Feminist 
organization's have provided free medical services, crisis centers, and 
community centers. When carried far enough, the more collective goods an 
organization provides, the fewer individual goods constituents need. An 
expensive strategy of providing individuals with some specific benefit in 
exchange for their participation may be supplanted by a cheaper strategy 
of providing goods that all can enjoy. If some potential constituents 
ride free, others get acquainted and linked with the movement. 
3. Through struggle, social movements may succeed in forcing 
authorities to bring about collective goods that reduce the costs of par- 
ticipation. When a protest movement succeeds in forcing the repeal of re- 
pressive legislation, it reduces future costs to participants. When 
unions succeeded in reducing the work week, they increased the discretion- 
ary time of their constituents; when unions succeeded in raising wages, 
they increased the discretionary income of their constituents. These 
struggles reduced the subsequent cost of contributing time and money to 
- . the union. . . . . ... . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . ? _  . . - 
Selective Incentives Dependent upon.Consciousness and Solidarity 
1. . When a potential constituent views a social movement and sees 
something in it for him, it is often something he expects to receive (or 
avoid) in the future only if the movement succeeds. A peasant gives his 
support to revolutionaries in the hope of being rewarded after the revolu- 
tion, only if he expects there to be a revolution. If bringing about the 
collective good will put the movement in a position to reward its friends, 
then consciousness raising inevitably provides selective incentives, and 
the latter are an uninteresting explanation of mobilization. But the con- 
victions that "History is on our side," and "Victory is inevitable," 
rarely attract opportunists until the opposition is visibly crumbling. 
During the early stages of many social movements, when mobilization is 
most problematic and interesting, distant promises of selective incentives 
are easily discounted. Some theorists have suggested that the anticipated 
gain of future individual goods is what motivates many organizers of col- 
lective-good-providing outfits (see Frolich, Oppenheimer, and Young, 1971). 
i 
While there may be quite a few such-political Elmer Gantrys, it is hard to 
believe that they play a decisive role in most social movements. 
2. While some selective incentives depend on a consciousness of 
the movement's opportunities, others depend on a consciousness of the 
movement's worth. If social movements provide constituents with valued 
friends, esteem, status, insignia, posters, red books, or brown shirts, 
they facilitate mobilization primarily to the extent that constituents 
'share principles that the movement defends. As we have already noted, 
social clubs and fraternal orders can generally provide "social incen- 
tives" at less cost, since they don't bear the burden of providing col- 
lective . . goods. . .. And even when a social movhent organization is the best 
. .  . . . . .. . . . . 
fraternal order on the market (or when a fraternal order becomes a social 
movement organization) the problematic aspect of mobilization is raising 
the consciousness that the continued value of the "social incentives" 
ultimately depends upon. It is relatively easy for a social movement to 
provide opportunities for people to make friends or display insignia. 
If this were what it takes to mobilize,~mobilization would be less diffi- 
cult an enterprise. 
3 .  In some communities, scab workers would run the risk of being 
ostracized, despised, and spat upon. These are very real social incen- 
tives. Perhaps they would also run the risk of losing access to various 
informal mutual aid services which carry material benefits. And maybe 
they would run the risk of getting beaten up. By utilitarian logic, 
they wouldn't scab. But, insofar as these selective incentives are dished 
out spontaneously by informally organized members of the community, the 
interesting question for students of mobilization is why community members 
sanction scabs. If the community is large, each sanction has an imper- 
ceptible effect on the outcome of the struggle. Sanctioning is less cost- 
ly than the struggle, but it is part of the collective action nonetheless. 
We would look for an answer to this problem along the lines sug- 
gested in the "solidarity" section of this paper. When a person's fate 
is bound to the fate of the group, he feels threatened when the group is 
threatened; and he expects others in the group to feel the same way. 
He is likely to support the goals of group action, but he is obliged to 
support the group anyway. Inspired by loyalty in other group members 
and offended by disloyalty, he may sanc.tion them accordingly. And, de- 
pending on his own response to the group's call to action, he feels self- 
. . . .. . . 
' . respect or shame. . , - . . .. . . . . . . . . . 
Solidarity blurs the distinction between individual and collective 
goods. When a person's self-concept and way of life are tightly bound to 
a group, especially when the group is democratically organized and when 
the group is powerful, participants experience a control over their fate 
that they lack as individuals. The logic of their action is unlikely to 
be utilitarian. 
When Does Mobilization Best Fit the Utilitarian' Account? 
1. When social movement organizations have the armed force it 
takes to tax and draft soldiers, or when they control access to crucial 
goods and services (e.g., jobs, patronage), they may have the capacity 
to maintain or extend their level of mobilization primarily by means of 
selective incentives. If the past enterprise which produced such power 
to induce or constrain is not'of interest to the investigation at hand, 
it may be assumed. 
.2. Some social movement organizations mobilize enough resources 
from one constituency on the basis of solidarity and responsibility so 
that they can mobilize another constituency on the basis of self 
interest. Sometimes it's worthwhile to do so because the mobili- 
zation of the latter constituency'is vital to success. Even in such 
cases, as in number one above, the amount of inducements or constraints 
necessary to mobilize the problem constituency should vary with its 
solidarity and strength of principle. It is easier to govern a sympathet- 
' ic population than a hostile one. 
~onclus ion . - .  
. . . . . .  . :> . . . .  . 
. . . . .  . . .  
The problem we address in this paper is akin to the classic prob- 
lem of social order. Sociologists have long recognized that the exis- 
tence of social order can't be taken for granted, that an explanation is 
required to account for large numbers of people going about their daily 
lives in coordinated fashion and, in the process, producing certain col- 
lective goods (and bads) that hold society together. 
The problem of the mobilization of a potential constituency by 
social movement actors addresses similar issues with reference to a group. 
By posing the  production .of s o c i a l  movements a s  t h e  production of s o c i a l  
o rde r  ( r a t h e r  than a  symptom of d i s o r d e r ) ,  the  resource mobi l iza t ion  per- 
spec t ive  breaks sha rp ly  wi th  much p a s t  research.  Y e t  w i th in  t h e  resource 
mobi l iza t ion  pe r spec t ive  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r i n g  approaches t o  s o c i a l  move- 
ment mobi l iza t ion  t h a t  p a r a l l e l  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  approaches of  p a s t  re- 
search  t o  t h e  o r i g i n s  of s o c i a l  o rde r .  . W e  a r e n ' t  sugges t ing  t h a t  t h e  
mixture of '  coercion,  shared  values,  and voluntary exchange t h a t  glues 
toge the r  any p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i e t y  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  mixture t h a t  g lues  to- 
ge the r  any s o c i a l  movement; only t h a t  many of the  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  . i n  t h i s  .. 
paper have long been d iscussed ou t s ide  t h e  s o c i a l  movement l i t e r a t u r e .  
Without eva lua t ing  u t i l i t a r i a n  approaches t o  the  problem of o rde r  i n  
a  soc ie ty ,  w e  cons ider  problems with u t i l i t a r i a n  accounts of s o c i a l  move- 
ment mobi l iza t ion .  W e  sugges t  t h a t  research  focus on how organ ize r s  r a i s e  
consciousness of common i n t e r e s t s ,  develop oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n ,  and t ap  c o n s t i t u e n t s '  s o l i d a r i t y  and p r i n c i p l e s .  Systematic in-  
v e s t i g a t i o n  of  what works f o r  o rgan ize r s  should o f f e r  promising ground f o r  
t h e o r e t i c a l  advance. 
. . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . 
Appendix 
Here w e  summarize some of our argument more formal ly .  L e t ' s  assume 
w e  know the  i n t e r e s t s  of an a c t o r  (A). A has  an i n t e r e s t  i n  g e t t i n g ,  
b r ing ing  about ,  o r  keeping each of a  number of goods, s e r v i c e s ,  and spe- 
c i f i c  s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s .  We a r r a y  them s o  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  m a r e  t h e  indi -  
v idua l  goods and t h e  l a s t  n a r e  the  c o l l e c t i v e  goods. Let  "i.'' r ep resen t  
any of the  i n d i v i d u a l  goods and "j" represen t  any of the  c o l l e c t i v e  goods. 
V ( i )  and V ( j )  r ep resen t  t h e  va lues  t o  A of the  i t h  and t h e  j t h  a a 
goods, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  These values may b e  thought of a s  d o l l a r s ,  u t i l e s ,  
o r  a n y ' u n i t  of worth t h a t  le t ' s  us compare A ' s  i n t e r e s t s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
goods. 
Let  P l ( i )  and P l ( j )  be the  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  A w i l l  g e t  the  i t h  and 
the  j t h  goods, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  i f  A organizes  o r  j o i n s  i n  the  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  t h a t  w e  a r e  considering.  P 2 ( i )  and P 2 ( j )  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  probabil-  
i t ies  t h a t  A w i l l  g e t  the  i t h  and the  j t h  goods i f  A takes  t h e  b e s t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  course  of a c t i o n .  The a l t e r n a t i v e  may mean jo in ing  i n  an 
. . a l t e r n a t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  o r .  it may mean doing nothing i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  , . . .  . . .. . . . -  _ , . 
Now, i n s o f a r  a s  u t i l i t a r i a n  assumptions a r e  v a l i d ,  A w i l l  j o i n  i n  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i f  and only i f :  
Unless A is e s p e c i a l l y  r e source fu l  o r  any of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  goods a r e  
e s p e c i a l l y  easy  t o  come by, i t  should be  c l e a r  t h a t  f o r  each j: 
Therefore: 
i 
-0 z v a ( j ) ~ p i ( j )  - p 2 ( j > l p  
And A w i l l  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i f  and only i f :  
So i f  A is  any ordinary a c t o r  ( resource fu l  a c t o r s  a r e  t r e a t e d  sep- 
a r a t e l y  below), A ' s  i n t e r e s t s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods drop ou t  of the  model. 
For any j ,  n e i t h e r  V ( j )  nor P ( j )  nor P  ( j )  nor any r e l a t i o n s  among them 
a  1 2 
are r e l e v a n t  t o  A ' s  propensity t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  (except  in- 
s o f a r  a s  they a f f e c t  I v a ( i ) [ P l ( i )  - P 2 ( i ) ] ) .  
i 
W e  may a l s o  drop from considera t ion a l l  ind iv idua l  goods f o r  which 
Pl ( i )  = P ( i ) ,  namely a l l  the ind iv idua l  goods t h a t  A i s  j u s t  a s  l i k e l y  2  
t o  g e t  r egard less  of whether or  not  he j o i n s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  The 
remaining ind iv idua l  goods include the  con t r ibu t ion  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion ,  
7 
any inducements, any c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and any oppor tuni ty  c o s t s .  
W e  argue t h a t  most s o c i a l  movements 
would never g e t  oTf the  ground i f  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s '  dec i s ions  t o  par- 
t i c i p a t e  were based exclus ively ,  o r  even p r imar i ly ,  upon ind iv idua l  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t .  S o c i a l  movements a r e  o f t e n  f a c i l i t a t e d  by the  s o l i d a r i t y  of a  
group of a c t o r s  shar ing common i n t e r e s t s .  Rapid mobi l iza t ion of s o c i a l  
movements is  o f t e n  p r e c i p i t a t e d  by conspicuous t h r e a t s  t o  common i n t e r e s t s  
and by  conspicuous^ o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  common i n t e r e s t s  .to be defended by 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  S e l f - i n t e r e s t  i s  on ly  one b a s i s  f o r  mobil izat ion.  To 
s t a t e  t h i s  formally w e  in t roduce  s e v e r a l .  terms t h a t  weren ' t  needed i n  
p resen t ing  the  u t i l i t a r i a n  model. 
Let  S  s t and  f o r  how much A is l inked  t o  a  s o l i d a r y  group a t  r i s k  t o  
mobi l i za t ion .  (On pages 22-23'we n o t e  t h e  k inds  of r e l a t i o n s  w e  would 
count t o  determine A ' s  l i nkage  t o  a  s o l i d a r y  group.) Sol idary  groups have 
i n t e r e s t s ;  they have s t a k e s  i n  p rese rv ing  some s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  and i n  
changing o t h e r s .  Let  V ( j )  b e  the  i n t e r e s t  t h e  group has  i n  the  j t h  
g 
c o l l e c t i v e  good.. For the  sake of t h e  d i scuss ion  he re ,  the  s t r e n g t h s  of 
a  group 's  va r ious  i n t e r e s t s  may be  t r e a t e d  a s  though they a r e  measurable 
i n  comparable u n i t s .  
P 3 ( j )  s t and  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  the  group w i l l  g e t  ( o r  preserve)  the  
j t h  c o l l e c t i v e  good even i f  the  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  under cons idera t ion  does 
n o t  happen. 'perhaps  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i l l  b r i n g  about ' t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  good anyway, 
o r  perhaps i t  w i l l  be  brought about by some a l t e r n a t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  Reca l l  
t h a t  f o r  each ordinary  a c t o r  E ( j )  = P 2 ( j ) ,  and they amount t o  the  proba- 1 
b i l i t y  t h a t  the  j th good w i l l  somehow b e  brought  about .  Subtrac t ing  P3( j )  
. . .  . . .  . .. ... . : . ' . . . .. . . 
from t h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  w e  can l e t  P  ( j )  - P ( j )  represen t  t h e  "urgency'~ 2  3 
of the  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  -- the  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  the  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
makes t o  the  chances of g e t t i n g  the  c o l l e c t i v e  good. (Some of the  f a c t o r s  
which a f  f e c t  the  urgency of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a r e  d iscussed above, pg. 32- 
38.)  Now the  group's s t a k e  i n  . c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  can be represented  by: 
Combining t h e  group's  s t a k e  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  with the  a c t o r  ' s 
s t a k e  i n  the  group, w e  suggest  t h a t  F V g ( j )  [ P 2 ( j )  - P3( j ) ]S  rep resen t s  
J 
an 2mportant b a s i s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  The h igher  the  va lue  of t h i s  
express ion f o r  the  a c t o r s  i n  a  group a t  r i s k  t o  mobi l iza t ion ,  the  more 
s o l i d a r i t y  and l o y a l t y  impel them t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  This i s  
so  even i f  f r e e  r i d i n g  could reap  f o r  them a l l  the  b e n e f i t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  without  r i s k i n g  p e n a l t i e s .  
Un t i l  now w e  have assumed t h a t  on ly  one group i s  the  locus  of s o l i -  
d a r i t y  f o r  any a c t o r .  But sometimes a c t o r s  have va r ious  important  ties 
t o  s e v e r a l  groups which may d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  Let g  s tand f o r  
any of G r e l e v a n t  groups, and l e t  S_ s t and  f o r  A ' s  l i nkage  t o  g. Now we 
5 G 
can l e t  Z Vg(j) [ P 2 ( j )  - P g ( j  )IS r e p r e s e n t  the  combined e f f e c t s  upon 
g=1 J g  
A ' s  p ropensi ty  t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of A ' s  s t a k e s  i n  these  groups 
and these  groups' s t a k e s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  The more the  d i f f e r e n t  
groups t o  which A i s  v i t a l l y  l inked  s h a r e  common i n t e r e s t s  i n  threatened 
c o l l e c t i v e  goods, t h e  more l o y a l t y  impels  A t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
But- i f  t he  groups have c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  i n  the  c o l l e c t i v e  goods, A ' s  
p ropensi ty  . to  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  i s  a t t enua ted .  . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . _ . .  . . . . 
So f a r  we have presented  two bases  f o r  mobi l iza t ion  among ordinary  
a c t o r s :  f i r s t ,  p u r s u i t  of ind iv idua l  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  and second, s o l i d a r i t y  
wi th  a  group i n  the  p u r s u i t  of group i n t e r e s t s .  Now w e  p resen t  a  t h i r d  
b a s i s . .  The genera l  i d e a  i s  t h a t  a c t o r s  may f e e l  a  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  con- 
t r i b u t e  t h e i r  sha re  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n s o f a r  a s  i t  s t ands  a  chance of 
br inging about something they value .  The terns needed t o  express  t h i s  
more formally have a l r eady  been in t roduced.  V ( j )  r ep resen t s  A ' s  i n t e r e s t  a  
i n  the  j t h  c o l l e c t i v e  good. P Z ( j )  - P (j) r e p r e s e n t s  the  d i f fe rence  t h a t  3  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  makes t o  the  chances t h e  j t h  good w i l l  come about.  We 
suggest  t h a t  the .  h igher  Z Va(j) [ P 2 ( j )  - P j ( j )  ] i s  f o r  A, an ordinary  a c t o r ,  
J 
the  g r e a t e r  i s  A ' s  p ropensi ty  t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
The express ion above represen t s  the  expected va lue  of what A would 
g a i n  from f r e e  r i d i n g .  W e  a r e  simply s u g g e s t i n g . t h a t  the  more worthwhile 
t h e . r i d e  is t o  A ,  the.more l i k e l y  A is t o  c o n t r i b u t e  a  share  of the  cos t s .  
For the  most p a r t  a  person 's  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  c o l l e c t i v e  good (Va(j))  
i s  broadly constrained: .  by h i s  i n t e r e s t s  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  goods ( L v a ( i ) )  and 
i 
by the  i n t e r e s t  of h i s  s o l i d a r y  group(s)  i n  the  c o l l e c t i v e  good (V ( j ) ) .  
g  
So i n  many s t r u g g l e s  t h i s  t h i r d  b a s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  r e i n f o r c e s  the  
o the r  two presented  above. .But i n  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  wi th  s t rong  e t h i c a l  
codes, t h e r e  a r e  a c t o r s  who may j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t h a t  breaks wi th  
a l l  t h e i r  p a s t  s o l i d a r y  groups and involves  personal  s a c r i f i c e s .  The two 
n o n u t i l i t a r i a n  bases  f o r  mobi l iza t ion  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  l i k e l y  t o  work i n  
tandem i n  many s i t u a t i o n s  because bo th  depend i n  p a r t  upon [ P 2 ( j )  - P3 ( j )  ] 
. . -- i .e. t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  make t o  the  provis ion  
of the  c o l l e c t i v e  good. Our po in t  h e r e  i s  t h a t  t h i s  t h i r d  b a s i s  f o r  
mobi l i za t ion  is  d i s t i n c t  from the  o t h e r  two, al though i t  may o f t e n  supple- 
. . . . .  . . . . . :  ment them.' .,. .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . 8 . . . . .  , . . . . . 
Now w e  pu t  together  the  terms discussed s o  f a r ,  and model the  pro- 
p e n s i t y  of the  o rd ina ry  a c t o r s  i n  a  s o l i d a r y  group t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  (Resourceful  a c t o r s  w i l l  b e  added t o  the  model l a t e r . )  For t h e  
sake of argument, w e  assume t h a t  t h e  terms i n  the  model -- the  i n t e r e s t s ,  
the  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of  r e a l i z i n g  them, and the  group a f f i l i a t i o n s  -- a l l  
may be es t imated  f o r  the  a c t o r s  i n  a  s o l i d a r y  group, a t  a  time when some 
o rgan ize r s  o r  o rgan iza t ions  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  mobil ize the  group f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  I n i t i a l l y ,  our  dependent v a r i a b l e  is whether o r  not  an a c t o r  
j o i n s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  The model is: 
where X, = V i P - p 2 ( i )  1 
i a  
A l l  of  the  terms have a l r eady  been def ined,  b u t  we de f ine  them again  h e r e  
f o r  convenience : 
V ( i )  and Va(j)  a r e  the  va lues  t o  t h e  a c t o r  of  the  i t h  and j t h  goods, 
a 
r e s p e c t i v e l y  ; 
V ( j )  i s  the  value  of the  j t h  c o l l e c t i v e  good t o  the  g th  group 
g  
S  is t h e  degree of  l inkage  t h a t  the  a c t o r  has t o  t h e  g t h  group; 
g  
P  ( i )  and P l ( j )  a r e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  the  a c t o r  w i l l  rece ive  t h e  
1 
i t h  and j t h  goods r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  i t  he organizes  o r  j o i n s  
. . .  . . .  . . 
i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ;  
P  ( i )  and P  ( j )  a r e  the  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  the  a c t o r  w i l l  r ece ive  t h e  
2  2 
i t h  and j t h  goods r e s p e c t i v e l y  i f  he takes  some a l t e r n a t i v e  
. . . -  . . . - - . . cour.se of  a c t i o n  (for .  example, does nothing) ; . . . . . . 
and P  (j) i s  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e -  a c t o r  w i l l  rece ive  the  j t h  good 3 
i f  t he  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  ques t ion  does not  occur.' 
The model sugges ts  some r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among what we consider  t o  be 
key determinants  of a c t o r s '  p r o p e n s i t i e s  t o  j o i n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
Such a  model can h e l p  make sense of v a r i o u s  s t r a t e g i e s  by which o rgan ize r s  
t r y  t o  mobi l ize  var ious  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  And i t  enables  us t o  s t a t e  more 
p r e c i s e l y  our disagreements with the  u t i l i t a r i a n  l o g i c  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
It makes sense t o  th ink of " s e l f  i n t e r e s t "  when i n t e r p r e t i n g  b  1 ' 
" loyal ty"  when i n t e r p r e t i n g  b2,  and " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  when i n t e r p r e t i n g  b  3 ' 
By u t i l i t a r i a n  l o g i c ,  bl should be s u b s t a n t i a l  but  the  o the r  parameters 
(and the  e r r o r )  should be t r i v i a l .  I n  o t h e r  words, only changes i n  X 
1 
should a f f e c t  the  a c t o r s '  propensity t o  mobil ize.  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  we  th ink 
t h a t  b and b d i f f e r  i n  i n t e r e s t i n g  ways according t o  the  const i tuency 2 3 
and t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  epoch, b u t  they a r e  o f t e n  q u i t e  s u b s t a n t i a l .  Our 
expec ta t ions  about b do n o t  d i f f e r  from u t i l i t a r i a n  expecta t ions ;  but  we 1 
b e l i e v e  th-at  i t  is o f t e n  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  o rgan ize r s  t o  r a i s e  X than 
1 
i t  i s  f o r  them t o  r a i s e  t h e  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s .  Even though b2 may be much 
lower than bl i n  some consti tuency,  o rgan ize r s  may f i n d  t h a t  t h e  most 
e f f i c i e n t  use of what resources  they have i s  t o  work on the  X r a t h e r  than 
2 
t h e  X of t h e i r  cons t i tuen t s .  
1 
The argument becomes s t ronger  when w e  use an aggregated ve rs ion  of 
t h e  model t o  consider mobi l iza t ion over t i m e .  Let Y be the  proport ion of 
t h e  consti tuency mobilized a t  each p o i n t  i n  time; and l e t  t h e  X ' s  es t imate  
average l e v e l s  of the  re levan t  i n t e r e s t s ,  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  and s o l i d a r i t i e s ,  
wi th in  the  const i tuency a t  each p o i n t  iri t i m e .  We expect  t h a t  when var iance  
i n  X1 is  dec i s ive  t o  mobi l iza t ion,  i t  i s  usua l ly  brought about by h i s -  
t o r i c a l  fo rces ,  conjunctures of events ,  or  agents of repress ion;  s o c i a l  
movement organizers  usual ly  iack the  kind of resources i t  takes  t o  sanct ion 
c o n s t i t u e n t s  with s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives .  
Over t i m e ,  the  most v o l a t i l e  term i n  the  model is  P Z ( j )  - P ,  a 
component of both X2 and X Recal l  t h a t  t h i s  term represen t s  t h e  'urgency' 3 ' 
of c o l l e c t i v e  action--the d i f fe rence  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is l i k e l y  t o  make i n  
t h e  chances t h a t  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  good w i l l  be gained (or  p ro tec ted) .  The 
c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion  under considera t ion is  n o t  .very urgent when a u t h o r i t i e s  
o r  r i v a l  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  provide the  c o l l e c t i v e  good anyway, 
when cons t i tuen t s  a r e n ' t  mobilized enough f o r  the  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion  t o  seem 
poss ib le ,  and when the  t a r g e t  is r e l a t i v e l y  invulnerable  t o  the  c o l l e c t i v e  
ac t ion .  But P 2 ( j )  - P ( j )  may rise suddenly with events  b r ing ing  sharp 
3 
changes in t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of c o a l i t i o n  pa r tne r s ,  i n  t h e  p o l i c i e s  and 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  of enemies and r i v a l s ,  and i n  the  number of c o n s t i t u e n t s  who 
a r e  a l ready mobilized. 
The consequences of t h e  l a t t e r  a r e  key t o  mobi l i za t ion ' s  v o l a t i l i t y .  
I f  cons t i tuen t s '  propensi ty  t o  mobilize is a f f e c t e d  by t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which 
they a r e  a l ready mobilized, then mobi l iza t ion and demobil izat ion feed upon 
themselves. Not only does mobil izat ion a t  one point  in t i m e  a f f e c t  mobili- 
za t ion a t  t h e  nex t ,  b u t  a t  each .point  i n  time a c t o r s '  decis ions  depend 
upon . t h e i r  e s t ima t ion  of  each o the rs '  cu r ren t  and. f u t u r e  decis ions .  - Con- 
s t i t u e n t s  e s t ima te  each o the rs  i n t e n t i o n s  through processes  t h a t  a r e  n e i t h e r  
scheming nor  i r r a t i o n a l ,  n e i t h e r  ' s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n '  nor  ' c i r c u l a r  reac- 
t i o n ' .  Among a c t o r s  who share  s o l i d a r y  r e l a t i o n s  ( see  pg. 22-23), i n t e r -  
ac t ion  can be coopera t ive ,  s e n s i b l e ,  and p r inc ip led ,  a t  l e a s t  as much s o  as 
circumstances permit .  ,Here is t h e  po in t  a t  which o rgan ize r s  can o f ten  in- . , 
tervene most e f f i c i e n t l y .  Even i f  they c a n ' t  provide s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives ,  
organizers  may be  a b l e  t o  coordinate -communication and decision-making, 
pool t h e  resources t h a t  cons t i tuen t s  a r e  ready t o  con t r ibu te ,  and o f f e r  a  
. . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  
. . 
plan of &tion.  Demonstrating t o  c o n s t i t u e n t s  t h a t  they s h a r e  a readiness 
t o  mobilize and t h a t  they have a mobil izing agent ,  i n c r e a s e s  t h e i r  propen- 
s i t y  t o  mobilize. 
But when do organizers  and p r i o r  organizat ions  commit themselves t o  
mobilizing o the r  a c t o r s  f o r '  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ?  So f a r  our  model only dea l s  
with ordinary a c t o r s .  We now expand i t  t o  include "resourceful" ones a s  
well .  
A " resource fu l  actor"' i s  def ined t o  b e  any a c t o r  (A) f o r  whom P ( j )  - 
1 
P 2 ( j )  is  no t i ceab ly  g r e a t e r  than zero,  f o r  some c o l l e c t i v e  good ( j )  a t  s t a k e  
i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  When. they .  c o n t r i b u t e ,  r e s o u r c e f u l .  a c t o r s  not iceably  
inc rease  t h e  expected value of what is  t o  be gained by c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
Unlike ordinary  a c t o r s ,  they gek less worthwhile a  r i d e  i f  they decide t o  r i d e  f o r  
f r e e  . 
W e  agree  wi th  u t i l i t a r i a n  l o g i c  t h a t  i t  makes a d i f f e r e n c e  t o  A 
whether A makes a d i f f e r e n c e  t o  the  outcome of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  We 
th ink  t h i s  is s o  rega rd less  of whether t h e  b a s i s  f o r  , the given mobiliza- 
t i o n  is  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  o r  l o y a l t y .  So we expand the  
model t o  inc lude  X4 and X where X = Z vg( j )  [Pl ( j )  - PZ ( j )  1 Sg and 5 4 g i  
x5 =xV ( j ) [ P l ( j )  - P 2 ( j ) 1 .  .By d e f i n i t i o n  X = X = 0 f o r  ordinary  
j 
a 4 5 
a c t o r s .  The expanded model, thus,  looks l i k e  t h i s :  
where a l l  terms a r e  a s  defined e a r l i e r .  
How should the  two new parameters be  i n t e r p r e t e d ?  I f  it makes sense 
t o  i n t e r p r e t  b a s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and b a s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  then the  i n t e r -  
1 3 
p r e t a t i o n  of b5 is i n h e r e n t l y  ambiguous. The h igher  X5 is, the  more A 
has  t o  gain from cod t r ibu t ing ;  and s o  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  impels A t o  cont r ibute .  
A t  the  same time, i t  i s  f requen t ly  included i n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  codes t h a t  
those who can m a k e a  d i f f e r e n c e  have a s p e c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  con t r ibu te .  
So s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  may coincide ,  d i c t a t i n g  the  same 
response t o  'any change i n  X 5 ' 
To untangle t h i s  ambiguity i n  the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of b i n  any p a r t i c -  5 
I *  
u l a r  s tudy,  w e  would have t o  consider  the  n a t u r e  of  the  r e source fu l  a c t o r ' s  
s t a k e  i n  the  r e l e v a n t  c o l l e c t i v e  goods. Following Olson and o t h e r  u t i l i -  
t a r i a n s  ( i n  o rde r  t o  confront  them more d i r e c t l y )  we do no t  l i m i t  the 
worth of a c o l l e c t i v e  good t o  i t s  m a t e r i a l  worth. For t h e  purposes of 
t h i s  d i scuss ion ,  we a l low a c t o r s  t o  have a  s t rong  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  c o l l e c t i v e  
good ( l i k e  the  l i b e r a t i o n  of d i s t a n t  people) from which they may gain  no 
concre te  b e n e f i t s .  I f  " a l t r u i s t i c "  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  awkward i n  u t i l i t a r i a n  
a n a l y s i s  -- and w e  th ink  they a r e  -- i t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  awkward t o  c a l l  
i t . s e l f - i n t e r e s t  when a l t r u i s t i c  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  pursued by resource fu l  
a c t o r s  who may be  s a c r i f i c i n g  va luab le  i n d i v i d u a l  goods. On the  o the r  
hand, when w e  c a l l  i t  " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  we should keep i n  mind t h a t  regard- 
less of whether m a t e r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  a t  s t a k e ,  what i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  
good t o  one group is  very o f t e n  a  c o l l e c t i v e  bad t o  another;  and i t  may 
b e  awkward t o  apply the  term "responsible" t o  a c t i o n  we oppose. Af ter  
a l l ,  s o c i a l  movements o f t e n  f i n d  t h a t  most a c t o r s  r e source fu l  enough t o  
c o n t r i b u t e  subs t a n t i a l l y  t o  t h e i r  mobi l i za t ion  a r e  r e spons ib le  t o  t h e i r  
a n t a g o n i s t s .  
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of b4 a s  l o y a l t y  r a t h e r  than s e l f - i n t e r e s t  makes 
sense  i n s o f a r a s  Va(j) d i f f e r s  from V (j) f o r  the  r e source fu l  a c t o r s  i n  
g  
the  cons t i tuency,  and i n s o f a r  a s  S accounts  f o r  some of the var iance  i n  
X4. (Otherwise X reduces t o  X5 and t h e r e  a r e  more ambigui t ies . )  Gen- 
4  
e r a l l y ,  b5 should be  smaller than b j ,  and b4 should b e  smal ler  than bp. 
While a l l  f r e e  r i d i n g  may be i r r e s p o n s i b l e  and d i s l o y a l  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s ,  
f r e e  r i d i n g  i s  worse on both counts  when the  withheld con t r ibu t ion  not iceably  
damages t h e  prospects  of r e a l i z i n g  common i n t e r e s t s .  (Depending upon t h e  u n i t s  
of V (j) , b and b may shr ink  wi th  group s i z e .  Loyalty d i c t a t e s  t h a t  
g  2 4 
you he lp  the  group, b u t  the  bigger the  group, the  l e s s  of the  group 's 
t o t a l  needs must come from you.) 
When the  cases we consider  a r e  e i t h e r . a c t 0 r . s  i n  a  s o l i d a r y  group, 
o r  t i m e  p o i n t s  i n  the  h i s t o r y  of a  s o l i d a r y  group, w e  take the  b ' s  a s  
f i x e d  f o r  the  s o l i d a r y  group ( a s  assumed i n  the  model). But i f  we con- 
s i d e r  a number of groups i n  s e v e r a l  s o c i e t i e s  and epochs, we may assume 
the b ' s  t o  be  v a r i a b l e s .  Then i t  would be i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  ask how and 
when s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  and l o y a l t y  a r e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  a s  
bases of mobi l iza t ion f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Footnotes 
'we a r e  g r a t e f u l  f o r  comments on an e a r l i e r  d r a f t  of t h i s  paper from 
Ronald Aminzade, Carol Connel, Myra Marx Feree, Anne Locksley, M . J .  Maynes, 
John McCarthy, Mancur Olson, Michael Polen, Steven Rytine, Jan Smith, and 
Charles T i l l y  . 
'others have expressed s i m i l a r  skept ic ism about the  arguments t h a t  we 
ques t ion here .  W e  found James Q. Wilson's P o l i t i c a l  Organizations (1973) 
e s p e c i a l l y  h e l p f u l ,  although Wilson i s  less focused on social.movement ac- 
t o r s  than w e  a re .  K. Wilson and Orum (1976) and Wernette (1977) more spe- 
c i f i c a l l y  address p o l i t i c a l  mobi l iza t ion by s o c i a l  movement a c t o r s  with an 
argument s i m i l a r  t o  t h i s  paper. See a l s o  Gamson (1975, chapter  f i v e )  f o r  
a  d iscuss ion of some of t h e  arguments developed more completely here.  
3 ~ r e e  r i d e r s  may be  e s p e c i a l l y  demoralizing when t h e  goals  of c o l l e c t -  
i v e  ac t ion  are "exclusive c o l l e c t i v e  goods." The l a t t e r ,  unl ike  " inclus ive  
c o l l e c t i v e  goods," a r e  worth less t o  each c o n s t i t u e n t  the  l a r g e r  t h e  con- 
s t i tuency .  When the  a c t o r s  i n  t h e  cons t ruc t ion  indus t ry  pressure  t h e  govern- 
ment t o  encourage const ruct ion,  they seek an exclus ive  c o l l e c t i v e  good -- 
t h e  more a c t o r s  i n  the  indus t ry ,  the  less each a c t o r  gains from whatever 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  achieves.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, those  who seek c lean a i r  o r  
an end t o  war a r e  not  i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  When the  goals  of c o l l e c t i v e  ac- 
t i o n  a r e  "exclusive" i n  t h i s  sense,  f r e e  r i d e r s  can be seen no t  only a s  
f a i l i n g  t o  con t r ibu te  t h e i r  share  but  a l s o  a s  reducing t h e  worth t o  p a r t i c i -  
pants  of whatever c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  may gain. 
4White (1976) explores  t h i s  ve r s ion  of the  s e l e c t i v e  incen t ive  argu- 
ment and points  ou t  t h a t , .  under such a d e f i n i t i o n  of s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives ,  
"Olson is c o r r e c t  i n  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  people do not a c t  on t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  
unless they gain  a p r i v a t e  benef i t1 '  (p. 271). But she  c o r r e c t l y  recognizes 
t h a t  such a t a u t o l o g i c a l  so lu t ion  deprives the  idea  of any explanatory value. 
Heath (1976) a l s o  has  a very h e l p f u l  d iscuss ion of the  tautology problem i n  
s o c i a l  exchange theory more genera l ly .  
. . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . .. . . . . _ . . .  . . . 
'we rely h e r e  i n  ;he d i s t i n c t i o n  &de i n  Gamiori (1968)"bekween induce- 
ments and c o n s t r a i n t s ,  which opera te  on t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  a c t o r ,  and per- 
suasion,  which opera tes  on t h e - o r i e n t a t i o n  of the  a c t o r .  For a f u l l e r  d is -  
cussion of t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  s e e  pp. 73-81. 
60ur d iscuss ion of i n t e r e s t s  is  q u i t e  similar t o  and inf luenced by 
T i l l y  (1978) . 
7 
The con t r ibu t ion  genera l ly  c o n s i s t s  of t i m e  and e f f o r t ,  money, o r  per- 
haps some o t h e r  source. Some readers  may f ind  t h i s  r epresen ta t ion  of t h e -  
u t i l i t a r i a n  model c l e a r e r  i f  the  con t r ibu t ion  i s  taken out  of the  expression 
t h a t  sumes the  expected value of the  ind iv idua l  goods, and added t o  the  r i g h t  
s i d e  of t h e  inequa l i ty .  To do t h i s ,  l e t  t h e  contr ibut ion be t h e  l a s t  individ-  
u a l  good i n  the  a r r a y  of A ' s  goods- the  mth good. Then we can assume the  
u t i l i t a r i a n  a c t o r  (A) w i l l  con t r ibu te  and continue t o  con t r ibu te  a s  long as:  
m - 1  
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